(M + 1)st-Price Auction Protocol

Kikuchi, Hiroaki

doi:10.1007/3-540-46088-8_27

Cited by 55 publications

(59 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…In [15,16], the bidding prices are hidden via secret sharing. However, there are two weaknesses in [15] as follows.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are two weaknesses in [15] as follows. First, the relationships of multi-winner can not be solved.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Compared to [15,16], it does not need a secure channel among the bidders and the server. Meanwhile, the proposed scheme provides the authentication without increasing the communication cost.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Privacy-preserving combinatorial auction without an auctioneer

Mei

et al. 2018

J Wireless Com Network

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Combinatorial auctions are employed into many applications such as spectrum auctions held by the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). A crucial problem in such auctions is the lack of secure and efficiency mechanism to protect the privacy of the bidding prices and to ensure data security. To solve the problem, we propose an approach to represent the price as a polynomial's degree based on verifiable secret sharing. So, we can obtain the two polynomials's degree maximum/sum by the degree of the two polynomial's degree sum/product. In the protocol, the bidders' information is hidden. The auctioneers can receive the shares without a secure channel, so our protocol is more applicable to more scenarios. The scheme can resist the collusion attack, passive attack and so on.

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“…In [15,16], the bidding prices are hidden via secret sharing. However, there are two weaknesses in [15] as follows.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…However, there are two weaknesses in [15] as follows. First, the relationships of multi-winner can not be solved.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Privacy-preserving combinatorial auction without an auctioneer

Mei

et al. 2018

J Wireless Com Network

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“…Depending on the underlying security model these proposals can be classified into the following three categories. In the first category, there are protocols that rely on computation that is distributed among auctioneers who jointly determine the outcome of an auction using threshold multi-party computation (e.g., [14,15,22]). The second category of protocols introduces a semi-trusted third party, aka an "auction issuer" or "auction authority", in addition to the auctioneer, and uses asymmetric multiparty computation technique, such as Yao's garbled circuit (e.g., [1,2,5,19,21]).…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Auctions in do-not-track compliant internet advertising

Reznichenko

Guha

Francis

2011

Proceedings of the 18th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security

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Online tracking of users in support of behavioral advertising is widespread. Several researchers have proposed nontracking online advertising systems that go well beyond the requirements of the Do-Not-Track initiative launched by the US Federal Trace Commission (FTC). The primary goal of these systems is to allow for behaviorally targeted advertising without revealing user behavior (clickstreams) or user profiles to the ad network. Although these designs purport to be practical solutions, none of them adequately consider the role of the ad auctions, which today are central to the operation of online advertising systems. This paper looks at the problem of running auctions that leverage user profiles for ad ranking while keeping the user profile private. We define the problem, broadly explore the solution space, and discuss the pros and cons of these solutions. We analyze the performance of our solutions using data from Microsoft Bing advertising auctions. We conclude that, while none of our auctions are ideal in all respects, they are adequate and practical solutions.

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“…In the determination phase only bids greater than or equal to the winning bid are revealed. But the number of possible bids is very small as in the protocol presented in [7] where the calculation of the ¡ -price sealed-bid auction is split among a number of auction servers greater than the number of possible bids. The bids are encoded in degrees of random polynomials to compute winning bid and winners.…”

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confidence: 99%