Private auctions with multiple rounds and multiple items

Sadeghi, Ahmad-Reza; Schunter, Matthias; Steinbrecher, Sandra

doi:10.1109/dexa.2002.1045932

Cited by 9 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 14 publications

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“…Most works done so far on multi-unit auctions are extensions of Vickrey auction [12] with somewhat strong assumptions. First, bidders in these auctions always look for bundle of units [11] and thus multi-unit Vickrey auctions become the optimal choice for solving the winner determination problem. Second, a major part of the literature assumes the objects in the multi-object auctions to have a common value.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential and Concurrent Auction Mechanisms for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Sengupta

Chatterjee

2007

2007 2nd International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications

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With the ever growing demands for spectrum, authorities (e.g., FCC in United States) are defining ways that allow reallocation of spectrum bands that are under-utilized. In this regard, FCC made provisions to open under-utilized bands for both licensed and unlicensed services. A new paradigm called dynamic spectrum access (DSA) is being investigated that would allow wireless service providers (WSPs) to dynamically seek more spectrum when and where they need without interfering with the primary users. Currently, there is little understanding on how such a dynamic allocation of spectrum will operate so as to make the system feasible under economic terms. In this paper, we analyze the dynamic spectrum allocation process from an auction theoretic point of view where n WSPs (bidders) compete to acquire necessary spectrum band from a pool of m (n > m) spectrum chunks. For the purpose of selfcoexistence, each of the WSPs is granted at most one chunk of spectrum to minimize interference among themselves and with licensed services. In this regard, we investigate both sequential and concurrent auction mechanisms to find WSPs' optimal price bid and compare both the auction mechanisms in terms of revenue generated. We show that sequential auction is a better mechanism for DSA.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Sequential and Concurrent Auction Mechanisms for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Sengupta

Chatterjee

2007

2007 2nd International Conference on Cognitive Radio Oriented Wireless Networks and Communications

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“…They also demand for a deposit of digital cash for each player to ensure non-repudiation in their cryptographic auction scheme. Sadeghi, Schunter, and Steinbrecher [28] presented a combinatorial auction, that sells multiple interdependent items by proceeding multiple rounds. They consider the German UMTS auction as an example, where every winner had to win at least two licenses.…”

Section: Related Work Concerning Electronic Auction Systemsmentioning

confidence: 99%

t-Private and t-Secure Auctions

Hinkelmann

Jakoby

Stechert

2008

J. Comput. Sci. Technol.

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In most of the used auction systems the values of bids are known to the auctioneer. This allows him to manipulate the outcome of the auction. Hence, one is interested in hiding these values. Some cryptographically secure protocols for electronic auctions have been presented in the last decade. Our work extends these protocols in several ways. Based on garbled circuits, i.e., encrypted circuits, we present protocols for sealed-bid auctions that fulfill the following requirements:1. Protocols are information-theoretically t-private for honest but curious parties.2. The number of bits that can be learned by malicious adversaries is bounded by the output length of the auction.3. The computational requirements for participating parties are very low: only random bit choices and bitwise computation of the XOR-function are necessary.Note that one can distinguish between the protocol that generates a garbled circuit for an auction and the protocol to evaluate the auction. In this paper we address both problems. We will present a t-private protocol for the construction of a garbled circuit that reaches the lower bound of 2t + 1 parties, and a more randomness efficient protocol for (t + 1) 2 parties. Finally, we address the problem of bid changes in an auction.

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“…To address this huge variety of possible auction settings and to achieve different security and efficiency properties numerous protocols have been developed, e.g. [4,11,19,20,21,22,23] and references therein.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Brandt’s Fully Private Auction Protocol Revisited

Dreier

Dumas

Lafourcade

2013

Progress in Cryptology – AFRICACRYPT 2013

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Abstract. Auctions have a long history, having been recorded as early as 500 B.C. [17]. Nowadays, electronic auctions have been a great success and are increasingly used. Many cryptographic protocols have been proposed to address the various security requirements of these electronic transactions, in particular to ensure privacy. Brandt [4] developed a protocol that computes the winner using homomorphic operations on a distributed ElGamal encryption of the bids. He claimed that it ensures full privacy of the bidders, i.e. no information apart from the winner and the winning price is leaked. We first show that this protocol -when using malleable interactive zero-knowledge proofs -is vulnerable to attacks by dishonest bidders. Such bidders can manipulate the publicly available data in a way that allows the seller to deduce all participants' bids. Additionally we discuss some issues with verifiability as well as attacks on non-repudiation, fairness and the privacy of individual bidders exploiting authentication problems.

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Private auctions with multiple rounds and multiple items

Abstract: Abstract

Cited by 9 publications

References 14 publications

Sequential and Concurrent Auction Mechanisms for Dynamic Spectrum Access

Sequential and Concurrent Auction Mechanisms for Dynamic Spectrum Access

t-Private and t-Secure Auctions

Brandt’s Fully Private Auction Protocol Revisited

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