Macroeconomic implications of a sharing compensation scheme in a model of endogenous growth

Liu, Chia-ying; Chang, Juin‐jen

doi:10.1007/s00712-010-0163-y

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 29 publications

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“…6 If Union S is the leader and Union N is the follower, Union S determines the wage rate so as to maximize S subject to (14), the reaction function of Union N. After observing the wage rate of Union S, Union N determines the wage rate according to its best-response function. The wage rates and the employment levels in the Stackelberg equilibrium are: …”

Section: Wage Determination (Stage 2)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit-Sharing and the Endogenous Order of Moves in Oligopoly

Takami¹,

Nakamura²

2012

TEL

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Whether firms move sequentially or simultaneously is one of the most important questions in the oligopoly theory. Forms of firms and/or their remuneration systems influence the decisions. This paper analyzes the effect of profit-sharing on the endogenous order of moves in a wage-setting stage of a unionized duopoly where one adopts profit-sharing while the other does not. It is shown that the two firms do not move simultaneously. In addition, if a fraction of profits going to the union is large, the Stackelberg equilibrium with the profit sharing firm moving first emerges endogenously.

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Section: Wage Determination (Stage 2)mentioning

confidence: 99%

Profit-Sharing and the Endogenous Order of Moves in Oligopoly

Takami¹,

Nakamura²

2012

TEL

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Eco-Translatology: Research Foci and Theoretical Tenets

2020

Eco-Translatology

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Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

Bárcena‐Ruiz

2016

Port Econ J

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Profit sharing schemes have been analysed assuming Cournot competition and decentralised wage negotiations, and it has been found that firms share profits in equilibrium. This paper analyses a different remuneration system: employee share ownership. We find that whether firms choose to share ownership or not depends on both the type of competition in the product market and the way in which workers organise to negotiate wages. If wage setting is decentralised, under duopolistic Cournot competition both firms share ownership. If wage setting is centralised, only one firm shares ownership if the degree to which goods are substitutes takes an intermediate value; otherwise, the two firms share ownership. In this case, if the union sets the same wage for all workers neither firm shares ownership. Therefore, centralised wage setting discourages share ownership. Finally , under Bertrand competition neither firm shares ownership regardless of how workers are organised to negotiate wages.

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Macroeconomic implications of a sharing compensation scheme in a model of endogenous growth

Abstract: Sharing compensation scheme, Endogenous growth, Market imperfection, Optimal taxation, J33, O41,

Cited by 4 publications

References 29 publications

Profit-Sharing and the Endogenous Order of Moves in Oligopoly

Profit-Sharing and the Endogenous Order of Moves in Oligopoly

Eco-Translatology: Research Foci and Theoretical Tenets

Employee share ownership in a unionised duopoly

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