Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance

Traxler, Christian

doi:10.1016/j.jpubeco.2011.07.006

Cited by 13 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 47 publications

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“…while the source used is limited to paper, there are no books or proceedings in it (Balestrino, 2010). This observation strategy was carried out in order to improve the quality of paper observations from several years ago and are constantly being updated to facilitate and enrich reader literacy (Traxler, 2012). In this case the problem referred to in this study is related to Tax Avoidance.…”

Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study Literature Review of the Rise of Tax Avoidance Practices

Hasibuan¹,

Muda²,

Kesuma³

2023

IJSSR

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This study aims to find out how many companies are trying to avoid taxes. This research was conducted by observing a number of papers, namely by documenting various articles related to tax avoidance and then adapting them according to several categories until finally there were 313 articles that could be used. Initially there were 644 articles, then adapted based on the selection of abstracts and several inappropriate criteria so that the number became 404 articles, and then read again until finally there were 313 articles that could be examined. In this study, the fact is that many companies are trying to avoid taxes, utilizing the services of tax consultants in order to reduce the amount of corporate tax that must be paid. In addition, the company always tries to use a variety of very subtle techniques so that the tax authorities cannot find out, there is a very significant difference in relation to carrying out tax evasion by taking advantage of loopholes in the law compared to carrying out illegal tax evasion and this will certainly lead to new problem for the company. Thus, the urgency of paying taxes will always be supervised and monitored by the government due to certain targets in an effort to increase the realization of tax revenues every year.

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Section: Methodsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Study Literature Review of the Rise of Tax Avoidance Practices

Hasibuan¹,

Muda²,

Kesuma³

2023

IJSSR

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“…Summarizing, taxpayers are heterogeneous along two dimensions of the tax avoidance 'technology': with respect to attribute k j -determining the cost of as a foreign resident, and not on reported income. 9 See, e.g., Slemrod (2001) and Traxler (2012) for thorough treatments of the cost of underreporting in the context of tax avoidance. 10 We assume an interior solution x H (t; k j ) ≥ 0 for all types of taxpayers.…”

Section: Cheating On Income or On Residencementioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Tax Administration under Fake Residency and Tax Avoidance

Esteller-Moré,

Galmarini

2023

Preprint

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In a two-country model, the citizens of a ‘big home country’ can either fictitiously move residence to a ‘small foreign country’ where residence-based taxes are lower (external avoidance), or under-report the tax base at home (internal avoidance). The home and the foreign government compete on tax rates, with the former also setting two types of administration policies, each one targeting one type of tax avoidance. Although tax revenue is maximized by employing both types of administration policies, the optimal policy faces a tradeoff in terms of fiscal outcomes: in fiscal environments with large intrinsic opportunities of tax avoidance, internal avoidance increases and external avoidance decreases, while the reverse occurs in environments with small opportunities.

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“…In the same line as our study, both papers obtain equilibria in which preferences for income redistribution are nonmonotonic in taxpayers' income . Another paper in a similar line is Taxler (), which focuses on the welfare consequences of the possibility of tax avoidance in the standard model of redistributive policies. Taxler found that the higher the median voter's level of avoidance, the higher the inefficiency produced by the tax schedule chosen by majority vote.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

Solano-García

2017

J Public Economic Theory

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This paper analyzes the political economy of income redistribution when voters are concerned about fairness in tax compliance. We consider a two‐stage model where there is a two‐party competition over the tax rate and over the intensity of the tax enforcement policy in the first stage, and voters decide about their level of tax compliance in the second stage. We find that if the concern about fairness in tax compliance is high enough, a liberal middle‐income majority of voters may block any income redistribution policy. Alternatively, we find an equilibrium in which the preferences of the median voter are ignored in favor of a coalition formed by a group of relatively poor voters and the richest voters. In this equilibrium income redistribution prevails with no tax enforcement.

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Majority voting and the welfare implications of tax avoidance

Cited by 13 publications

References 47 publications

Study Literature Review of the Rise of Tax Avoidance Practices

Study Literature Review of the Rise of Tax Avoidance Practices

Optimal Tax Administration under Fake Residency and Tax Avoidance

Fairness in tax compliance: A political competition model

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