Managing Institutional Research Advancement: Implications from a University Faculty Time Allocation Study

Abstract

While much is known about faculty time allocation, we know very little about how traditional managerial factors influence faculty time allocation behaviors. We know even less about the possible downsides associated with relying on these traditional managerial factors. Using survey data from the National Science Foundation/Department of Energy Survey of Academic Researchers, our study predicts faculty time allocations to grant writing as a function of pressure from administrative superiors. We then examine how pressure from administrative superiors influences faculty job satisfaction and the likelihood to pursue uninteresting research grants. Our findings indicate that faculty time spent pursuing grants increases in response to pressure from administrative superiors but that this same pressure is associated also associated with increases in pursuit of uninteresting research grants as well as decreases in work satisfaction. Our study contributes to better understanding of the merits and limitations of traditional, hierarchical approaches to managing university faculty behavior.

Organizations, Policies, and the Roots of Public Value Failure: The Case of For‐Profit Higher Education

“…This logic is characterized at least in part by a clear organizational objective of profit maximization and development of strategies (i.e., marketing strategies) and organizational structures (i.e., sales or enrollment departments) to fulfill this objective. In this logic, managerialism is the dominant operational paradigm, and supervisor–subordinate relations are more meaningful than they are in traditional higher education (Anderson and Slade ). Many for‐profits have high‐pressure sales environments (see Coutts ; Kirkham ), and some of the most profitable for‐profit colleges spend more money on marketing than instruction on a per‐student basis (Stratford ).…”

Who instigates university–industry collaborations? University scientists versus firm employees

“…On the issue of initiation versus management, which we investigated in hypothesis 3, firm employees are relatively less likely to initiate collaborations than their university counterparts but they seem to generally take over management once the collaboration has been established. This can be attributed to differences in time horizons between university scientists (long-term) and firm employees (short-term) (Link et al, 2008;Libaers, 2012;Anderson and Slade, 2016;and, broadly, Juster and Stafford, 1991) as well as to differences in personality types (Erez and Shneorson, 1980). University scientists are interested in actually carrying out the research but they would rather avoid administration and management tasks of those projects (Grimpe, 2012).…”

“…However, they require creative structuring, as the clock speed of academic research and business practice can be wildly divergent. Conversely, many academics think long-term, and this can be an advantage for a business as it may overcome managers' tendency to look to the next quarter (Link et al, 2008;Libaers, 2012;Anderson and Slade, 2016;and, broadly, Juster and Stafford, 1991). "Going long" with academics in the search for new ideas can unlock a range of possibilities and even help to create a new innovation ecosystem that will sustain the business for longer periods of time into the future (O'Kane et al, 2015).…”

“…In terms of the management of collaborative activities, we will expect all types of collaborations to be more likely to be managed by firms than by university scientists (Grimpe and Hussinger, 2013). Given the strong pressure on time and cost in industrial R&D as well as the need to keep tight control over research results once they emerge but also the competence of industrial R&D to manage projects, it seems likely that we will observe firms taking over the management of projects to a higher degree than university scientists, even if those projects were not initiated by the firms (Erez and Shneorson, 1980;Link, Swann, and Bozeman, 2008;Libaers, 2012;Anderson and Slade, 2016;and, broadly, Juster and Stafford, 1991). This may be due to the lack of competence but academics may also be more willing to pass on management tasks in exchange for higher funding or more freedom to set own research priorities.…”

Publicly funded principal investigators allocation of time for public sector entrepreneurship activities

“…The complex challenges of university administrators to control allocation of time spent by university faculty members on their various work activities has been documented (Hull 2006;Paewai et al 2007). Anderson and Slade (2016) found that pressure from university management increased the likelihood of faculty allocating more time to the pursuit of grants, including what they describe as uninteresting grants that contribute to decreases in work satisfaction. Auranen and Nieminen (2010) suggest that the shift in research funding from institutional-based to competitive grant based system has impacted adversely on faculty research time.…”