Managing Marketing Channel Opportunism: The Efficacy of Alternative Governance Mechanisms

Brown, James R.; Dev, Chekitan S.; Lee, Dong Jin

doi:10.1509/jmkg.64.2.51.17995

Cited by 449 publications

(410 citation statements)

References 70 publications

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“…The importance of the relational norms of exchange has generated strong support, on the other hand (John 1984;Brown et al 2000;Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).…”

Section: Research Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

“…In addition, recent research also suggests the important role of socialization, or relational norms in managing opportunism (cf. Brown et al 2000). Table 2.1 summarizes the previous literature investigating the determinants of opportunism.…”

Section: Chapter II Literature Review Opportunism Management In Markementioning

confidence: 99%

“…Studies have shown that relational norms effectively deter opportunism (cf. Brown, Dev, and Lee 2000). Assuming the worst in each other clearly is not the solution to opportunism, but research is still lacking in the area to address the issues.…”

Section: Introduction Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Moreover, some economic control mechanisms for managing opportunism (i.e., vertical integration and credible commitments in the form of transaction specific investments) have been found to actually increase opportunism in marketing channels (cf. Brown et al 2000). The literature has also found monitoring to have inadvertent, negative effects (e.g., John 1984;Murry and Heide 1998).…”

Section: Introduction Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Bad Apples, Bad Barrels, and the Structure of Marketing Channel Relationships: Analyses of the Propensity for Opportunism and Opportunistic Behaviors

Ishida¹

2014

Marketing, Technology and Customer Commitment in the New Economy

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The theoretical frameworks of transaction cost economics and agency theory are widely used to design appropriate governance structure for constraining opportunism within marketing channels. These approaches generally assume that marketing channel managers are opportunistic, and only economic constraints deter opportunism in exchange relationships. However, some empirical studies have shown that managers do not always behave opportunistically even if conditions permit such behavior. In addition, some researchers have proposed a "cycle of self-fulfilling prophecy" and have argued that the uncritical assumption of opportunism and excessive use of control mechanisms such as monitoring only exacerbates the problem. Thus, it is important to identify conditions in which opportunism likely occurs.The present research argues that marketing channel managers exhibit differing propensities for opportunism (PFO), and it spans three levels of analysis to identify contributing factors. The individual-level analysis treats marketing channel managers as a heterogeneous population and investigates the impact of individual traits on their behaviors in business relationships. At the dyadic level, I modify standard microeconomics models to incorporate norms of fairness. Finally, the extra-dyadic level of analysis goes beyond the traditional dyadic focus to include network-wide social influence on a relationship. Using the data collected from 162 unit franchieees. the hypotheses were tested using structural path analyses.The findings of this dissertation provide guidance on the extent to which costly and potentially damaging control mechanisms are really necessary in a given marketing channel relationship. Overall, the research contributes to the existing literature by reexamining a fundamental behavioral assumption about marketing channel managers and providing an alternative framework that can meaningfully inform us as to when and why opportunism occurs.

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“…The importance of the relational norms of exchange has generated strong support, on the other hand (John 1984;Brown et al 2000;Rokkan, Heide, and Wathne 2003).…”

Section: Research Significancementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Chapter II Literature Review Opportunism Management In Markementioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introduction Problem Statementmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 2 more Smart Citations

Bad Apples, Bad Barrels, and the Structure of Marketing Channel Relationships: Analyses of the Propensity for Opportunism and Opportunistic Behaviors

Ishida¹

2014

Marketing, Technology and Customer Commitment in the New Economy

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“…Relational exchange norms and values such as role integrity, mutuality, solidarity, flexibility, bilateral information exchange, harmonious conflict resolution and long term orientation are shared between the partners, both individually and as a firm (Brown, Dev, & Lee 2000). These norms contribute to the existing social capital of partners and have an impact on the firm level organizational social capital.…”

Section: Key Management Team (Kmt) Ongoing Valuementioning

confidence: 99%

Supply-chain corporate venturing through acquisition: Key management team retention

Kiessling

Harvey

Moeller

2012

Journal of World Business

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Acquisitions are often used as a way to engage in corporate venturing. The value of these ventures tends to reside in the knowledge and capabilities of the key management team members who have and maintain key inter-organizational relationships. Because their knowledge and/or relationships may be tacit and therefore difficult to transfer, retaining the key managers in the acquired organization is often a critical issue for the human resource management of the acquiring organization. They are also frequently thought to be critical elements in the future performance in global supply chains and therefore, should be a key concern of human resource management after the acquisition has been culminated. Using a unique dataset of corporate acquisitions in supply-chains, we examine how the development of the psychological contract elements affects retention of critical key global managers. We find that higher retention of the key management team members leads to higher performance after acquisition. We also find that the development of the psychological contract has a positive impact on the retention of key managers with global supply-chain relations. © 2010 Elsevier Inc

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Marketing Channels

Brookes

2015

Wiley Encyclopedia of Management

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Managing Marketing Channel Opportunism: The Efficacy of Alternative Governance Mechanisms

Cited by 449 publications

References 70 publications

Bad Apples, Bad Barrels, and the Structure of Marketing Channel Relationships: Analyses of the Propensity for Opportunism and Opportunistic Behaviors

Bad Apples, Bad Barrels, and the Structure of Marketing Channel Relationships: Analyses of the Propensity for Opportunism and Opportunistic Behaviors

Supply-chain corporate venturing through acquisition: Key management team retention

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