Managing organizations in the third world: A case study of management control in a Bangladeshi jute mill

Abstract

This article reports on a study of the operation of management control systems in a large nationalized jute mill of Bangladesh. The study seeks to describe how 'control' operated in practice and to explain why the systems of control worked in these ways. Investigations revealed a number of significant factors. First, the organization operated in both competitive and regulated environments; it had little authority over its operational activities and, head office and the sponsoring ministry were prominent in organizational planning and control. Second, the accounting system in the mill was mainly a response to external legitimacy (e.g. stewardship and tax matters). Third, although budgeting was perceived as part of the formal structure of control, it was not a dominant mode of control in the organization; the budgeting system was created to comply with head office and state requirements. Fourthly, the mill managers used a variety of social/informal control and mechanisms to cope with the complexity and uncertainty around the mill's operations. This study reinforces the conclusions of other research claiming that the wider social, economic, political and institutional contexts govern the ways management control operates in an organization.Zahirul Hoque is at the Faculty

Reforms and budgetary oversight roles in Tanzania

“…Similar to other parliaments (Wehner, 2005), the role of the Tanzanian parliament was also shaped by political aspects. In line with other empirical accounting studies (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Hoque et al , 1994; Wickramasinghe et al , 2004; Li and Tang, 2009), the political party in power shaped accounting practices, including budgetary oversight roles. Some of the MPs were part of the executive (Lucas and Tshukudu, 2016).…”

“…Politics can also play a key role in driving and shaping change processes (Burns, 2000). This has also been observed in empirical accounting studies (Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Hoque et al , 1994; Wickramasinghe et al , 2004; Li and Tang, 2009; Goddard and Issa Mzenzi, 2015) where political parties in power shaped a change process. Burns (2000) argues that most scholars view politics generally in terms of “attaining interest-based demands” and “getting things done your way” (p. 569).…”

“…It also contributes to the understanding of how accounting is shaped by politics (e.g. Hoque and Hopper, 1994; Hoque et al , 1994; Wickramasinghe et al , 2004; Li and Tang, 2009; Goddard and Issa Mzenzi, 2015) and power (e.g. Berry et al , 2009; Tsamenyi et al , 2006; Burns, 2000; Powell and Tilt, 2017).…”

Institutional contradictions and change of organisations and accounting

“…The contradictions between structures of transparency, efficiency and markets versus political intervention, nepotism and social concerns, however, are also found in extant research (e.g. Uddin and Hopper, 2001;Hoque, Siddiquee and Hopper, 1994) and our findings are not inconsistent with extant research. The uniqueness of the case restricts generalizability but it is our hope that the ability to study relations between action and institutions in the close-knit and small Greenlandic society in more detail will spur interest in analysing how contradictory institutional structures, actors, and management accounting change interrelate over extended periods of time.…”

“…Nor-Aziah and Scapens (2007) analysed how change in a Malaysian company was loosely coupled both as a process and as an outcome because of power relations and lack of trust. This stream of research either focuses on the unfettered institutionalisation of accounting reforms or discusses the lack of institutionalisation due to decoupling (Hoque, Siddiquee and Hopper 1994). This approach, however, has difficulties explaining how change may come about without large institutional changes and often disregards the actor's view.…”