Managing transboundary stocks of small pelagic fish

Coping Strategies to Deal with Environmental Variability and Extreme Climatic Events in the Peruvian Anchovy Fishery

“…Management decisions are taken based on reports from the government' S marine research institute IMARPE, whose institutional objective is to provide scientific support for the sustainable management of marine resources. The government applies two different management schemes for the northern-central and the southern anchovy stock, the latter being exploited simultaneously by Peru and Chile [57].…”

Modeling adaptation in multi-state resource systems

“…The normalized parameters for the problem are the fish price, taken to be the numeraire, p = 1, 8 the relative unit cost of harvest, c = 0.33, the relative opening and closing fixed costs of harvest, a open = a close = 0.1, and the discount rate, δ = 0.075. Since data on the cost structure of the Peruvian fishery were not available and our assumptions for the unit cost of harvest and discount rate are based on data from the Chilean pelagic fishery included in Aguero and Gonzales (1996). 9 As a baseline we assumed that the fixed costs of opening or closing the fishery were equal to 30% of the cost of harvest, but we also tested the sensitivity of the results to this assumption.…”

Governing Marine Fisheries in a Changing Climate: A Game‐Theoretic Perspective

“…Game theorists have used two-player models to examine a wide range of fishery issues, including the dynamic externality between two nations' fish catch, through impacts on the fish stock (e.g., Clark 1980;Levhari and Mirman 1980); interactions between coastal and offshore fleets (Armstrong and Flaaten 1991;Sumaila 1995Sumaila , 1997; and control of overcapitalization and excessive effort (Aguero and Gonzalez 1996). Fisheries gametheoretic models have evolved in parallel with the emergence of new international fishery problems, including the growing need for effective cooperative management of fisheries exploited by multiple nations.…”