Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited-Capacity Suppliers

Dash, Rajdeep K.; Vytelingum, Perukrishnen; Rogers, Alex; David, Esther; Jennings, Nicholas R.

doi:10.1109/tsmca.2007.893474

Cited by 52 publications

(36 citation statements)

References 34 publications

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“…In particular, Dash et al adapt the CDA for a scenario where sellers have a limited capacity and a complex cost structure, defined by a fixed overhead cost and a constant marginal cost (Dash et al 2007). In that work, the extension of the CDA is empirically compared to a centralized mechanism that is known to find the optimal allocation, an approach we also adopt in this paper.…”

Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Specifically, in adopting a decentralized approach, we also want to ensure a good system-wide allocation of resources, i.e., we aim to maximize social welfare. Given that we need to deal with large numbers of agents (buyers and sellers in the market-based paradigm), who may enter or leave the market at any time and who want to be able to trade at any time, the Continuous Double Auction (CDA) is an appropriate choice (Dash et al 2007). Indeed, the CDA has already been shown to be a highly efficient mechanism for such cases (Gode and Sunder 1993).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Continuous Double Auctions with Execution Uncertainty

Valkenhoef

Ramchurn

Vytelingum

et al. 2010

Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing

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We propose a novel variant of the Continuous Double Auction (CDA), the Trust-based CDA (T-CDA), which we demonstrate to be robust to execution uncertainty. This is desirable in a setting where traders may fail to deliver the goods, services or payments they have promised. Specifically, the T-CDA provides a mechanism that allows agents to commit to trades they believe will maximize their expected utility. In this paper, we consider agents that use their trust in other agents to estimate the expected utility of a transaction. We empirically evaluate the mechanism, both against the optimal solution given perfect and complete information and against the standard CDA. We show that the T-CDA consistently outperforms the traditional CDA as execution uncertainty increases in the system. Furthermore, we investigate the robustness of the mechanism to unreliable trust information and find that performance degrades gracefully as information quality decreases.

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Section: Related Workmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Continuous Double Auctions with Execution Uncertainty

Valkenhoef

Ramchurn

Vytelingum

et al. 2010

Lecture Notes in Business Information Processing

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“…Besides its prevalence in financial markets, many variants of the DA have been successfully applied as a solution to a multitude of resource allocation problems [1], [2]. The importance of DAs lies in the fact that they exhibit a high allocative efficiency (ratio of traders' actual profit to their theoretical maximum profit) with the implementation of very simple rules.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Software Agents in Multiple Adaptive Double Auction Markets

Stavrogiannis

Mitkas

2009

2009 13th Panhellenic Conference on Informatics

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Abstract-The prevalence of on-line auctions has stimulated the interest of both the economists and computer scientists in an effort to understand and improve their rules. One famous form of these economic mechanisms is the double auction and, more specifically, the continuous double auction which is commonly used in today's major stock exchanges worldwide. Software agents constitute a promising tool for the study and implementation of novel double auction mechanisms. TAC Market Design tournament makes an attempt to study the competition among such dynamically adjusted market institutions trying to attract potential traders while maximizing their profit. In this paper we describe the tournament and discuss about the importance of the global competitive equilibrium in its economy. Moreover, we provide a simple, yet effective estimation technique for the latter that our entrant, Mertacor, has utilized during the games of 2008.

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“…In the former case, we have made advances in the areas of auctions (Dash et al, 2007Rogers et al, 2007a;Vetsikas et al, 2007;Gerding et al, 2008), coalition formation (Dang and Jennings, 2006;Fatima et al, 2009;Rahwan and Jennings, 2007;Chalkiadakis et al, 2008;, automated negotiation (Fatima et al, 2006;Karunatillake et al, 2009;Ramchurn et al, 2007;Fatima et al, 2004), trust and reputation , flexible reasoning strategies for workflows (Stein et al, 2009a) and decentralized coordination (Rogers et al, 2007b, Farinelli et al, 2008. In the latter case, we have built applications using these techniques in areas such as: virtual organizations (Norman et al, 2004), emergency response (Chapman et al, 2009), sensor networks (Padhy et al, 2006;Kho et al, 2009;, mobile sensors (Stranders et al, 2009), computational grids (Stein et al, 2009b) and personalized recommendations (Wei et al, 2005;Payne et al, 2006).…”

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confidence: 99%

Computational Service Economies: Design and Applications

Jennings

Rogers

2009

Studies in Computational Intelligence

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Many modern computing systems have to operate in environments that are highly interconnected, highly unpredictable, in a constant state of flux, have no centralized point of control, and have constituent components owned by a variety of stakeholders that each have their own aims and objectives. Relevant exemplars include the Web, Grid Computing, Peer-to-Peer systems, Sensor Networks, Cloud Computing, Pervasive Computing and many eCommerce applications. Now, although these areas have somewhat different areas of emphasis, we believe they can all be viewed as operating under the same conceptual model. Namely, one in which: (i) entities offer a variety of services in some form of institutional setting; (ii) other entities connect to these services (covering issues such as service discovery, service composition and service procurement); and (iii) entities enact services, subject to service agreements, in a flexible and context sensitive manner. Moreover, we believe agent-based computing, with its emphasis on autonomous, flexible action and interaction, is an appropriate computational model for conceptualizing, designing and implementing such systems (Jennings, 2000;Jennings 2001). In particular, such agents are a natural way of viewing flexible service providers and consumers that need both to respond to environmental change, while being able to work towards their individual and collective aims. Moreover, the interactions between these agents need to take place in some form of electronic institution that structures the interactions and can provide an effective matching of the appropriate producers and consumers. Everyday examples of such institutions might include: eBay, Second Life, Betfair exchanges or World of Warcraft. Nevertheless, in the work described here, we will focus specifically on trading institutions and in particular computational service economies that mediate the exchanges between software agents in the area of software services.In more detail, when thinking about the design of such computational service economies there are two major perspectives that need to be considered (Dash et al., 2003). First, there is the design of the institution itself; this can essentially be thought of as the rules of the game. This covers issues such as who are the valid participants (e.g. buyers, sellers, intermediaries), what are the interaction states (e.g. accepting bids, negotiation closed), what are the events causing state transitions (e.g. bid, time out, proposal accepted), what are the valid actions of the participants (e.g. propose, accept, reject, counter-propose) and what are the reward structures (e.g. who pays and who gets paid for what). Second, there is the design of the strategies for the agents that participate in the institution; this can essentially be thought of as how to succeed in the game. Such strategies are very much determined by the institutional rules and are essentially the decision making employed to

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Market-Based Task Allocation Mechanisms for Limited-Capacity Suppliers

Cited by 52 publications

References 34 publications

Continuous Double Auctions with Execution Uncertainty

Continuous Double Auctions with Execution Uncertainty

Software Agents in Multiple Adaptive Double Auction Markets

Computational Service Economies: Design and Applications

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