2009
DOI: 10.1016/j.tcs.2008.12.030
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Market equilibria with hybrid linear-Leontief utilities

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Cited by 6 publications
(3 citation statements)
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“…Using the connection between Nash equilibria and Arrow-Debreu equilibria, our complexity result on sparse games can be extended to market equilibria in economies with sparse exchange structures [Chen et al 2006b]. …”
Section: Theorem 14 Bimatrix Is Not In Smoothed Polynomial Time Unlmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Using the connection between Nash equilibria and Arrow-Debreu equilibria, our complexity result on sparse games can be extended to market equilibria in economies with sparse exchange structures [Chen et al 2006b]. …”
Section: Theorem 14 Bimatrix Is Not In Smoothed Polynomial Time Unlmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…We anticipate that our reduction techniques will help to resolve more complexity-theoretic questions concerning other families of exchange markets such as the general CES markets and the hybrid linear-Leontief markets [7].…”
Section: Our Contributionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Now we let x ′ and y ′ denote the two vectors obtained in (7). By Lemma 1 we have x ′ k , y ′ k ∈ [0, 1] for all k ∈ [n].…”
Section: Proof Of Theoremmentioning
confidence: 99%