Markets in votes: Alienability, strict secrecy, and political clientelism

Abstract

Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In doing so, it diminishes the credibility of all political actors’ clientelistic promises to reciprocate. By drastically reducing the transaction costs of vote exchanges, the legality of markets in votes would thus exacerbate the detrimental effects of political clientelism on the quality of democratic governments.

Impartiality and democracy: an objection to political exchange

“…Further, allowing a legal market in votes threatens another hallmark of democracy, the secret ballot. Nicolas Maloberti argues that even if tradable vote coupons allow for de jure voter secrecy, the mere possibility of exchange means that voters cannot help but reveal information about their voting preferences, ‘contained in their decisions when faced with offers to trade’ (Maloberti 2019: 203). Consequently, a market in votes erodes the secrecy of the ballot, creating the dual possibility for voter intimidation as well as clientelistic exchange (Maloberti 2019: 202–205).…”

“…Nicolas Maloberti argues that even if tradable vote coupons allow for de jure voter secrecy, the mere possibility of exchange means that voters cannot help but reveal information about their voting preferences, ‘contained in their decisions when faced with offers to trade’ (Maloberti 2019: 203). Consequently, a market in votes erodes the secrecy of the ballot, creating the dual possibility for voter intimidation as well as clientelistic exchange (Maloberti 2019: 202–205). By being able to credibly reveal support, voters and politicians would increasingly engage in forms of clientelism, where the public purse would be used to bestow private benefits in exchange for verifiable electoral support (Maloberti 2019: 203).…”

“…Consequently, a market in votes erodes the secrecy of the ballot, creating the dual possibility for voter intimidation as well as clientelistic exchange (Maloberti 2019: 202–205). By being able to credibly reveal support, voters and politicians would increasingly engage in forms of clientelism, where the public purse would be used to bestow private benefits in exchange for verifiable electoral support (Maloberti 2019: 203). Vote inalienability protects the secret ballot and thus is an essential safeguard against political clientelism.…”

“…According to the first objection, the poor become more politically disadvantaged when vote trading is permitted (Archer et al 2019). The second objection asserts that there is something intrinsically or functionally problematic with the action of selling one’s vote (Radin 1987; Maloberti 2019).…”