Standard rationales for the illegality of markets in votes are based on concerns over the undue influence of wealth and the erosion of civic responsibility that would result from the commodification of votes. I present an alternative rationale based on how the mere alienability of votes alters the strategic setting faced by political actors. The inalienability of votes ensure the strict secrecy of voting, that is, the inability of voters to communicate credibly to others the content of their votes. In doing so, it diminishes the credibility of all political actors’ clientelistic promises to reciprocate. By drastically reducing the transaction costs of vote exchanges, the legality of markets in votes would thus exacerbate the detrimental effects of political clientelism on the quality of democratic governments.

resUMeN este artículo elabora una teoría disuasoria del castigo sobre premisas lockeanas. siguiendo a autores como Warren Quinn y daniel Farrell, se sostiene que la justificación del derecho a castigar debe ser construida sobre el reconocimiento de la importancia de un derecho a formular amenazas de retaliación. contrariamente a esos autores, la articulación de ese reconocimiento se realiza dentro de una teoría lockeana de los derechos individuales. esto nos permite apreciar de una manera más adecuada el rol específico de la disuasión en una concepción plausible del castigo, y así responder a ciertas objeciones que se han formulado recientemente, especialmente por david Boonin.Palabras clave: Justificación del castigo, retaliación, disuasión, Locke. Quinn and Daniel Farrell, it ABSTRACT This article formulates a deterrence theory of punishment based on Lockean premises. Following authors such as Warren

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The last decade has produced a large literature on the public policy implications of behavioural research. Policymakers, in turn, have increasingly relied on 'choice architecture' or 'nudges' to address some of the consequences of individuals' judgment and decisionmaking biases documented by that research. However, the possibilities for mitigating the effects of individuals' biases in the realm of collective choice have not yet been exhaustively explored. This article suggests possible applications of behavioural research to mitigate the negative effects of voters' judgment and decisionmaking biases on the quality of democratic choice.