Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis

Manser, Marilyn E.; Brown, M.

doi:10.2307/2526238

Cited by 1,447 publications

(815 citation statements)

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“…3 We implicitly assume a single household utility function maximized by either an altruistic household head (Becker, 1981) or via consensus (Samuelson, 1956). Extensions in the literature consider cooperative (Manser and Brown, 1980;McElroy and Horney, 1981) and non-cooperative household bargaining models (Lundberg and Pollak, 1993;Hoddinott and Haddad, 1995). While these differ as to how utility is maximized, they share the common implication that the relative contribution of each spouse to total household income is important.…”

Section: Theoretical Framework and Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Intra-household commuting choices and local labour markets

Roberts

Taylor

2016

Oxf. Econ. Pap.

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Commuting is the conduit between two markets: labour and housing. While the job search literature recognizes the importance of the spatial distribution of employment, local labour market conditions have been a notable omission from the commuting literature. In the first study of its kind, we introduce local labour market conditions into a model of spouses' commuting behaviour in the UK. We find male commute times are more sensitive to local unemployment rates than women's, although both effects are inelastic, and are of a similar magnitude to that of labour income. The more conducive the local labour market is to female employment opportunities, the less time women spend commuting. Local unemployment rates have heterogeneous effects on commuting, e.g. arising from mode of transport, job change, and homeownership. Furthermore, housing market rigidities lead to longer commuting times and thus increase the social costs that a more flexible housing market could alleviate.JEL classifications: D19, J24, R40.

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Section: Theoretical Framework and Existing Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

Intra-household commuting choices and local labour markets

Roberts

Taylor

2016

Oxf. Econ. Pap.

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“…There are two types of family bargaining models: the separate spheres model ( Lundberg and Pollak 1993) and the divorce-threat model (Manser and Brown 1980;McElroy and Horney 1981). The spheres bargaining model, with internal threat points determined by the control of resources within marriage, is applicable to the Indian scenario, where divorce is highly restricted, especially for the higher castes.…”

Section: A Framework For Studying Kinship Institutions and Sex Ratiosmentioning

confidence: 99%

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

Chakraborty

Kim

2010

Demography

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This article explores the relationship between kinship institutions and sex ratios inver since Sen (1990) proclaimed that more than 100 million women are missing around the world, referring to the abysmally low fraction of women in the total population, the case of "missing women" has generated considerable interest. In contrast to Europe and North America, where the male-to-female sex ratio is 0.95 (favoring the presence of females), the ratio in many Asian countries -such as India, China, Taiwan, Hong Kong, and South Korea-is as high as 1.06, signifi cantly favoring the presence of males. 1 Moreover, in many of these countries, the male-to-female sex ratio seems to have risen over the second half of the twentieth century with economic development, declining family size, and the advent of technologies that facilitate self-selective abortion or sexselection (Park and Cho 1995).In India, and possibly elsewhere in Asia, however, the case of missing women has deep historical roots (Dyson and Moore 1983). Although identifying when the problem of missing women fi rst arose in India is diffi cult, British offi cials were well aware of the problem in North India during the mid-nineteenth century. 2 More reliable evidence from the British India censuses conducted during the late nineteenth century shows that this problem was clearly a northern rather than a southern or an eastern problem. The male-to-female sex ratio was highest in northern regions, such as Punjab; relatively equal in eastern regions, such as Bengal; but relatively low and favored women in southern regions, such as colonial Madras (Dyson and Moore 1983;Visaria 1961). 3 Although the regional difference in sex ratios narrowed between the northern and southern regions during the twentieth century, the narrowing is largely due to the convergence of southern sex ratios toward the northern fi gures. For all of India, the overall sex ratio increased from 1.03 to 1.07 between 1901 and 2001. During this period, however, the sex ratio in the historically most-masculine Punjab region in the North, ranging from *Tanika Chakraborty, DIW-Berlin, Mohrenstrasse 58, Berlin 10117; e-mail: tchakraborty@diw.de. Sukkoo Kim, Washington University and National Bureau of Economic Research. We gratefully acknowledge Bob Pollak and three anonymous referees for providing us with extremely valuable comments. We thank Karen Norberg, David Rudner, and seminar participants at the Work, Family and Public Policy workshop at Washington University and also at the 2008 annual meeting of the Population Association of America for helpful comments and discussions. We also thank Lauren Matsunaga and Michael Scarpati for research assistance and Cassie Adcock and the staff of the South Asia Library at the University of Chicago for their generous assistance in data collection. We are also grateful to the Weidenbaum Center and Washington University (Faculty Research Grant) for research support and to CRES at Olin School of Business for their generous conference funding. All errors are ours.1. B...

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“…McElroy and Horney (1981) and Manser and Brown (1980) added to this line of research by explicitly modeling bargaining processes between spouses. 3 See, for example, Grossbard-Shechtman (2003) for a useful discussion of the effects of wages on spousal time allocation.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

An empirical analysis of the time allocation of Italian couples: are they responsive?

2009

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The literature suggests that in Italy husbands contribute less to unpaid household work than in any other European country, while women have the lowest market employment rates. Here we examine the time allocation of Italian couples on which there are surprisingly few studies to date. We analyze simultaneously the time allocated by husband and wife to market work, childcare and housework, allowing for various interactions. We use data drawn from the Italian national Time Use Survey 2002-2003 for the analysis. We find that spousal time allocation is sensitive to personal and household characteristics, such as, in particular, education and children's age. Evidence shows that men married to more highly educated women spend more time with their children. The husband's own characteristics have less of an effect on women's time allocation. We also find that patterns differ substantially between weekends and weekdays. The estimated correlations between the unobservable factors affecting the couple's time allocation suggest that the time devoted by parents to childcare is complementary and that the time they devote to housework is substitutable across weekends and other weekdays.

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Marriage and Household Decision-Making: A Bargaining Analysis

Cited by 1,447 publications

References 10 publications

Intra-household commuting choices and local labour markets

Intra-household commuting choices and local labour markets

Kinship institutions and sex ratios in India

An empirical analysis of the time allocation of Italian couples: are they responsive?

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