Marriage Institutions and Sibling Competition: Evidence from South Asia

Abstract

Using data from South Asia, this paper examines how arranged marriage cultivates rivalry among sisters. During marriage search, parents with multiple daughters reduce the reservation quality for an older daughter's groom, rushing her marriage to allow sufficient time to marry off her younger sisters. Relative to younger brothers, younger sisters increase a girl's marriage risk; relative to younger singleton sisters, younger twin sisters have the same effect. These effects intensify in marriage markets with lower sex ratios or greater parental involvement in marriage arrangements. In contrast, older sisters delay a girl's marriage. Because girls leave school when they marry and face limited earnings opportunities when they reach adulthood, the number of sisters has well-being consequences over the lifecycle. Younger sisters cause earlier school-leaving, lower literacy, a match to a husband with less education and a less-skilled occupation, and (marginally) lower adult economic status. Data from a broader set of countries indicate that these cross-sister pressures on marriage age are common throughout the developing world, although the schooling costs vary by setting.

A dynamic framework for the study of optimal birth intervals reveals the importance of sibling competition and mortality risks

“…Social institutions such as arranged marriages can also affect sibling competition depending on birth order, the presence of same-sex siblings and local demography. In South Asia, for example, the presence of older sisters can increase a girl's education by allowing her to remain in school rather than marry (Vogl, 2013).…”

Marriage Markets in Developing Countries

“…Women with multiple older female siblings are likely to marry later due to the family preference of marrying daughters in birth order (Malhotra and Tsui, 1996;Ambrus and Field, 2008;Vogl, 2013). Desai and Andrist (2010) find that the practice of purdah or ghunghat 2 , male-female segregation in the household, and restricted female mobility are all associated with early age at marriage.…”

“…In addition to the choice of spouse, these transfers are expected to impact human capital investment, bequests, and even children's choice of post-marital residence (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2008 and the references therein; Vogl, 2013;Kedir and Oterová, 2017). The parents' utility maximizing solutions depend, inter alia, on the kinship and inheritance patterns (patrilineal, matrilineal, or bilateral), number and sex composition of children, and household wealth (Fafchamps and Quisumbing, 2008).…”