Masking the Strangulation of Opposition Parties as Pandemic Response: Austerity Measures Targeting the Local Level in Hungary

Abstract

While a large literature studies the various tools of autocratic survival, targeting opposition actors with austerity measures in electoral autocracies is hitherto understudied. This paper argues that the COVID-19 pandemic has provided a rare opportunity for Hungary’s Fidesz party to disarm opposition parties via cutting off resources of municipalities led by opposition mayors and eliminating any remnants of local governments’ fiscal autonomy. Analysing original data from government decrees on local transfers, this study contributes to the existing literature by conceptualising fiscal strangulation as part of electoral authoritarian regimes’ toolbox to discredit opposition parties and their ability to govern locally.

Az önkormányzati válságkezelés és/vagy reziliencia

“…Természetesen nem egyedi jelenség a kockázat és a károk megosztása a szintek között, de az eszköztelen, elszigetelt helyi önkormányzatok nem tudják használni azokat az előnyöket, amelyek a helyismeretből, beágyazottságból származnak. A helyi bevételek megnyirbálása, a krónikus információhiány általánossá vált, a kormányzattal való együttműködést a politikai ellentétek is akadályozták (Kovarek, Dobos 2023). Több empirikus felmérés is igazolta, hogy a járvány idején nem váltak lényegesen szorosabbá a kapcsolati hálók sem vertikálisan, sem horizontálisan, legfeljebb helyben volt együttműködés a döntéshozók között, és általában a polgármesterek sem éltek vissza személyes rendkívüli felhatalmazásukkal (Finta, Kovács, Pálné Kovács 2020;Fekete, Dombi, Oláh 2021).…”

The Effect of Government Cuts of Doctoral Scholarships on Science

“…After the year 2010, Hungary saw an increasing deterioration of its democracy. In 2010 Orbán was elected for the second time and with the Fidesz party obtained a strong majority in a context of political fragmentation of oppositions (Kovarek and Dobos, 2023). The strong majority allowed Orbán to start a series of reforms including the new constitution in 2011.…”

“…Kováts and Rónay (2021) argue that from 2012 onwards the Hungarian university system saw a significant reduction in performance-based financial resources and an increasing use of direct institutional funding and earmarked grants that "allowed the government to directly reward and punish institutions through financial subsidies or deductions". Orbán's use of government funding to expand its political power and bend oppositions has been documented in Hungary by Kovarek and Dobos (2023) which examined how the Fidesz party disarmed opposition by cutting off resources of municipalities. Within the university system, that was more subtle and happened mostly with cuts and reallocation of government-funded scholarships at all educational levels.…”