Matching-game approach for green technology investment strategies in a supply chain under environmental regulations

Liu, Li; Wang, Zhe; Zhang, Zaisheng

doi:10.1016/j.spc.2021.06.001

Cited by 36 publications

(12 citation statements)

References 53 publications

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“…We consider a supply chain consisting of the supplier (referred to as she) and the manufacturer (referred to as he), in which the supplier acts as a leader and the manufacturer acts as a follower. Thus, we build a Stackelberg game to solve the model, which is common in supply chain modeling (Liu et al, 2021; Meng et al, 2021). We compare three cases: first, the manufacturer was short of money in the production process, so he got a fund from the commercial bank, which is regarding as BCF; second, the manufacturer can get a green fund from the commercial bank if he meets and satisfies the carbon emission standards, which is referred to as GCF.…”

Section: Model and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Does green credit financing mode with cap‐and‐trade scheme really benefit all members?

Liu

Geng

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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There is a never‐ending debate about whether the cap‐and‐trade mechanism is a valid means of achieving carbon reduction. In this study, we examine it from the perspective of supply chain financing, as the cap‐and‐trade scheme appears to be an excellent solution to avoid the carbon emission requirements imposed by green credit financing services. We develop a theoretical framework for comparing three distinct kinds of financing modes: bank credit financing, green credit financing, and green credit financing with a cap‐and‐trade scheme. Based on Stackelberg game with stochastic demand, we then derive optimal outputs for the manufacturer and wholesale prices for the supplier. Counterintuitively, the green credit financing mode is less profitable for manufacturers with low investment in clean production due to stringent carbon emission requirements, yet it is advantageous for the supplier through a higher wholesale price. Conversely, the green credit financing combined with cap‐and‐trade scheme will result in a different situation in which the manufacturer will benefit from the green credit's lower interest rate, but the cap‐and‐trade mechanism will diminish the supplier's power in the Stackelberg game and reduce her profits. Finally, from the perspective of social welfare, the green credit financing mode with cap‐and‐trade scheme will not always benefit for the whole society. Even though it can improve the profit of the manufacturer and consumer surplus, it may lead to higher carbon emission and reduce profits of the supplier when the investment in clean production technology is limited.

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Section: Model and Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

Does green credit financing mode with cap‐and‐trade scheme really benefit all members?

Liu

Geng

2023

Manage Decis Econ

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“…( 2022) created a three-way evolutionary game model between two types of enterprises with varied R&D capabilities and banks. As a foundation for how governments can create the best subsidy plans to encourage managers' green technology innovation behavior, Liu et al (2021) explored how managers can achieve the best green technology investment-production strategies in the supply chain.…”

Section: Enterprise Green Technology Innovationmentioning

confidence: 99%

Research on multi-stage strategy of low carbon building material’s production by small and medium-sized manufacturers: A three-party evolutionary game analysis

Liu

Chen

et al. 2023

Front. Environ. Sci.

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Using green technology by building materials manufacturers to produce low-carbon building materials is an effective way to control carbon emissions and promote traditional industries’ green and low-carbon development. Based on the government, small and medium-sized building materials manufacturers, and scientific research institutes, this paper sets 15 variables that affect the strategy selection of game participants, establishes an evolutionary game model under the constraint of the carbon tax, explores the behavioral strategies of the three parties in the industry life cycle to produce low-carbon building materials, and analyzes the sensitivity of critical factors. Results: The government plays a leading role in the initial stage, which is gradually replaced by the market-leading mechanism as the low-carbon building materials industry develops to maturity. The government’s decision-making behavior is almost unaffected by the two, and appropriate subsidies and carbon tax penalties at each stage of the industry life cycle can help improve the enthusiasm of the other two parties to participate in low-carbon behavior. Establishing a reasonable income distribution coefficient between small and medium-sized building materials manufacturers and scientific research institutes is more conducive to speeding up the stable state than transferring and selling technology.

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“…Jauhari studied sustainable inventory management in closed-loop supply chains and found that green investments were effective in reducing emissions and increasing waste reporting, improving the environmental performance of the supply chain [13]. Liu et al investigated the dynamic investment strategy of green technologies and the impact of government subsidy incentives on investment and sustainable production decisions, using a supply chain of individual manufacturers and suppliers [14]. Dong et al analysed strategic investments in green product development in the supply chain and found that green product development investments by manufacturers resulted in greener products and greater environmental tax savings for manufacturers than green product development investments by retailers [15].…”

Section: Green Investment In the Supply Chainmentioning

confidence: 99%

The Impact of Green Technology Investment Levels on Competitive Supply Chain Integration Decisions

Zhang

Yue

et al. 2023

Sustainability

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The current study focuses on vertical supply chain integration, with a special emphasis on the competitive environment of green investment markets and green investments. The current study investigates the relationship between the final product’s green service level and integration and non-integration methods within two separate supply chain models, namely the Nash competition and Stackelberg game models. To attain its goals, the study utilises an inverse derivation technique and comparative analysis. The current study investigates the best integration approach depending on the level of environmental investment in the supply chain’s final product. The findings revealed that the inter-chain rivalry in green investment and the sensitivity coefficient associated with green investment impacted the integration decisions of competing chains in the Nash competition. Furthermore, when the coefficient of the sensitivity to green investment was greater than 0.375, the choice to integrate logistics service supply chains in a horizontal Nash competition was independent of the amount of service competition intensity. In such cases, taking a different strategy than the rival chain might potentially increase the grade of eco-friendly services provided by one’s own chain.

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Matching-game approach for green technology investment strategies in a supply chain under environmental regulations

Cited by 36 publications

References 53 publications

Does green credit financing mode with cap‐and‐trade scheme really benefit all members?

Does green credit financing mode with cap‐and‐trade scheme really benefit all members?

Research on multi-stage strategy of low carbon building material’s production by small and medium-sized manufacturers: A three-party evolutionary game analysis

The Impact of Green Technology Investment Levels on Competitive Supply Chain Integration Decisions

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