Matching Markets With Mixed Ownership: The Case for a Real‐life Assignment Mechanism*

Guillén, Pablo; Kesten, Onur

doi:10.1111/j.1468-2354.2012.00710.x

Cited by 38 publications

(26 citation statements)

References 41 publications

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“…In total, we calculate 200,000 allocations for each mechanism in each environment. We run the procedure, similar to the ordinal efficiency test by Guillen and Kesten (). We calculate the number of times TTC dominates ETTC with respect to the fairness criterion (TTC dominations) and the number of times ETTC dominates TTC (ETTC dominations).…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Nevertheless, ETTC produces significantly less justified envy in treatments with some correlation of the preferences. In addition to the usual comparison with respect to a number of justified envy situations, we employ the idea of Guillen and Kesten's () ordinal efficiency test to compare the allocations by the two mechanisms with respect to fairness dominance. We refer to this as the ordinal fairness test.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…For the same context, Guillen and Kesten () compare TTC to another, much less popular real‐life mechanism, which turns out to be equivalent to Gale‐Shapley's (1962) DA mechanism.…”

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confidence: 99%

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The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choice

Hakimov

Kesten

2018

Int Economic Review

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Standard-Nutzungsbedingungen:Die Dokumente auf EconStor dürfen zu eigenen wissenschaftlichen Zwecken und zum Privatgebrauch gespeichert und kopiert werden.Sie dürfen die Dokumente nicht für öffentliche oder kommerzielle Zwecke vervielfältigen, öffentlich ausstellen, öffentlich zugänglich machen, vertreiben oder anderweitig nutzen.Sofern die Verfasser die Dokumente unter Open-Content-Lizenzen (insbesondere CC-Lizenzen) zur Verfügung gestellt haben sollten, gelten abweichend von diesen Nutzungsbedingungen die in der dort genannten Lizenz gewährten Nutzungsrechte. Discussion papers of the WZB serve to disseminate the research results of work in progress prior to publication to encourage the exchange of ideas and academic debate. Inclusion of a paper in the discussion paper series does not constitute publication and should not limit publication in any other venue. The discussion papers published by the WZB represent the views of the respective author(s) and not of the institute as a whole. Terms of use: Documents in The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choiceby Rustamdjan Hakimov and Onur Kesten * A particular adaptation of Gale's top trading cycles procedure to school choice, the so-called TTC mechanism, has attracted much attention both in theory and practice due to its superior efficiency and incentive features. We discuss and introduce alternative adaptations of Gale's original procedure that can offer improvements over TTC in terms of equity along with various other distributional considerations. Instead of giving all the trading power to those students with the highest priority for a school, we argue for the distribution of the trading rights of all slots of each school among those who are entitled to a slot at that school, allowing them to trade in a thick market where additional constraints can be accommodated. We propose a particular mechanism of this kind, the Equitable Top Trading Cycles (ETTC) mechanism, which is also Pareto efficient and strategy-proof just like TTC and eliminates justified envy due to pairwise exchanges. Both in simulations and in the lab, ETTC generates significantly fewer number of justified envy situations than TTC.

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choice

Hakimov

Kesten

2018

Int Economic Review

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“…Evidence of confusion in matching markets can be found in some matching experiments in which participants are given the option to enter the market and refuse to do so, even when entering the market has no potential downside, see for instance Chen and Sönmez (2002) and Guillen and Kesten (2010). A recent paper, Hugh-Jones et al (2013), shows high confusion rates among participants facing the Probabilistic Serial Mechanism.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism

Guillén

Hing

2014

European Economic Review

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We test the effect of advice on the well known top trading cycles (TTC) matching algorithm in a school choice frame work. We compare three treatments involving third party advice [right advice (R), wrong advice (W), and both right and wrong advice (RW)] to a no-advice baseline (B). In line with previous literature the truth telling rate is higher than 80% in the baseline, but it becomes as low as 35% in the W treatment. Truth telling rates are also significantly lower in R than in B, and much lower in RW than in B. This evidence suggests that a vast majority of participants in our experiment were confused. Truth telling seems to work only as a default strategy, and participants can be heavily influenced by advice. The real life implementation of matching mechanisms may have been misguided by some laboratory experimentation.2

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“…In their design, which has three agents and two houses with an outside option, 100% of the subjects revealed their preferences truthfully. Guillen and Kesten [14] report an experiment on other mechanisms in the problem with existing tenants.…”

Section: Related Literaturementioning

confidence: 99%

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

Hugh-Jones

Kurino

Vanberg

2014

Games and Economic Behavior

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We report an experiment on the Probabilistic Serial (PS) mechanism for allocating indivisible goods. The PS mechanism, a recently discovered alternative to the widely used Random Serial Dictatorship mechanism, has attractive fairness and efficiency properties if people report their preferences truthfully. However, the mechanism is not strategy-proof, so participants may not truthfully report their preferences. We investigate misreporting in a set of simple applications of the PS mechanism. We confront subjects with situations in which the theory suggests that there is an incentive or no incentive to misreport. We find little misreporting in situations where misreporting is a Nash equilibrium. However, we also find a significant degree of misreporting in situations where there is actually no benefit to doing so. These findings suggest that the PS mechanism may have problems in terms of truthful elicitation.

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Matching Markets With Mixed Ownership: The Case for a Real‐life Assignment Mechanism*

Cited by 38 publications

References 41 publications

The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choice

The Equitable Top Trading Cycles Mechanism for School Choice

Lying through their teeth: Third party advice and truth telling in a strategy proof mechanism

An experimental study on the incentives of the probabilistic serial mechanism

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