Maximizing Resource Rent From the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries

Bertignac, Michel; Campbell, Harry F.; Hampton, John; Hand, A

doi:10.1086/mre.15.3.42629300

Cited by 47 publications

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“…Comparable results were found by Bertignac et al (2000), who analyse the management of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye and Southern albacore tunas in the Pacific Ocean. These stocks are harvested by a number of different gears.…”

Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 77%

The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy Implications

Bjørndal¹,

Brasão

2004

SSRN Journal

125

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Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 77%

The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy Implications

Bjørndal¹,

Brasão

2004

SSRN Journal

125

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“…Also, the optimal policy (B1) calls for the elimination of certain gear types. Comparable results were found by Bertignac et al (2000), who analyse the management of skipjack, yellowfin, bigeye, and Southern albacore tuna in the Pacific Ocean. These stocks are harvested by a number of different gear types.…”

Section: Policy Implicationsmentioning

confidence: 78%

The East Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Stock Collapse or Recovery?

Bjørndal¹,

Brasão²

2006

Marine Resource Economics

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“…As to prices, these are fixed and equal to unity for the purse seine fishery, but 10 and 6, respectively, for bigeye tuna and yellowfin tuna caught with longline. This price difference is set on the basis of Bertignac et al (2001), which reported price differentials of approximately this magnitude between the purse seine and the longline fishery.…”

Section: Economic Analysismentioning

confidence: 99%

“…There is good reason to expect the price of fish sold into that market to decline the more fish that is supplied; this was one of things analysed by Bertignac et al (2001). We shall not here consider the elasticity of 2 In reality there is some long line fishing for skipjack, as can be seen from Figure 1, but it is very small and has been ignored here for simplicity.…”

Section: Maximizing Rentsmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…We look not just at the rent-maximizing solution, but also at whether under ideal circumstances a grand, rent-maximizing coalition is likely to be stable, and what would be the outcome of competition among the fleets of the various nations participating in the fishery. For this reason a simpler model of the tuna stocks than the one used by Bertignac et al (2001), which is highly disaggregated spatially and allows for average rates of advection and diffusion of stock between the 5 degree squares making up the western and central Pacific region. When possible data from the disaggregated model are used in the much simpler highly aggregated model, but some of the model changes lead to requirements for different parameter estimates.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Rent-Maximization Versus Competition in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery

Hannesson

Kennedy

2009

Journal of Natural Resources Policy Research

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Where a fish stock straddles or migrates between country A's exclusive economic zone (EEZ) and country B's EEZ, or the high seas, vesting ownership rights in the stock with A does not ensure efficient harvesting of the stock. This problem arises in the case of migratory tuna stocks in the Western and Central Pacific Ocean (WCPO). Four species of tuna reside for only part of the year in the EEZs of coastal states, many of which are Pacific Island Countries (PICs). Most of the harvesting of the stocks is carried out by distant water fishing nations such as the USA, Japan, Taiwan, China and Korea.Problems arise for achieving efficiency and equity in the harvesting of the stocks by disparate countries. The problems are made more difficult by changes in the harvesting levels of one fleet affecting the rents of another fleet through changes in the age distribution of stock. These types of problem are under review by the Western and Central Pacific Fisheries Commission, formed in 2005. Results from an age-structured steady-state bioeconomic model are used to show: the changes in fleet rents and catches of tuna if all fleets form a cooperative grand coalition to deploy fishing effort to maximize rents over the WCPO; the likely non-stability of the grand coalition; and the inferior Nash Equilibrium outcomes if all fleets fish non-cooperatively to maximize their own rents.

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Maximizing Resource Rent From the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fisheries

Cited by 47 publications

References 0 publications

The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy Implications

The Northern Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Management and Policy Implications

The East Atlantic Bluefin Tuna Fisheries: Stock Collapse or Recovery?

Rent-Maximization Versus Competition in the Western and Central Pacific Tuna Fishery

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