McTaggart's paradox and Smith's tensed theory of time

Oaklander, L. Nathan

doi:10.1007/bf00413606

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

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“…To connect this brief discussion of relations with the issue at hand, I suggest that a further fundamental difference between A-and B-time is that on the B-theory there are, whereas on some versions of the A-theory there are not, primitive temporal relations. Thus for some B-theorists, including Russell (1915), (the early) C. D. Broad (1912), (the early) C. Williams (1994), Oaklander (1984Oaklander ( , 1998, and others, temporal relations are external in just this sense: They are primitive and unanalyzable relations indefinable in terms of tensed predicates and irreducible to tensed properties. On this version of B-time, the difference between spatial and temporal relations is an irreducible qualitative difference, and it is a mistake to suppose that if time is the mere succession of events, then the change involved is exactly like the spatial "change" in the color of the lawn one observes as one walks from the front to the back.…”

Section: A Is R 1 and B Is Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…Is there something unbelievable about A-time containing both the time relations of B-time and the modalities of past, present, and future? It is not my intention to pursue that question in this paper since I have done so extensively elsewhere (Oaklander and Smith [1994], Oaklander [1994Oaklander [ , 1996). Nevertheless, I think I have demonstrated that there are important metaphysical differences between alternative versions of the A-theory and the B-theory, and have given some reason to think that Williams is implicitly (and in my view correctly) sympathetic with the Btheory.…”

Section: A Is R 1 and B Is Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

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Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?

Oaklander¹

2001

Journal of Philosophical Research

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Clifford Williams has recently argued that the dispute between A-and B-theories, or tensed and tenseless theories of time, is spurious because once the confusions between the two theories are cleared away there is no real metaphysical difference between them. The purpose of this paper is to dispute Williams's thesis. I argue that there are important metaphysical differences between the two theories and that, moreover, some of the claims that Williams makes in his article suggest that he is sympathetic with a B-theoretic ontology. 1"1 n a recent and provocative paper, "The Metaphysics of A-and B-Time," Clifford Williams (1996b) has posed a challenge to those who hold either an A-theory or a B-theory oftime. The challenge is to explain just how these two theories differ, for, according to Williams, once the misinterpretations of the theories are cleared away there is no longer any coherent way of stating what differentiates them. Although there is much that is valuable in Williams's indistinguishability argument, he is mistaken when he claims that the traditional issue between A-and B-theories is a pseudo problem. What I think he should have claimed, and to some extent has shown, is that there really is only one kind of time, namely B-time, since when the B-theory is correctly understood, it will be seen to be adequate to our experience of the passage of time, self-consistent, and true. Clearly, any full defense of B-time lies outside of the scope of this paper.! My aims, therefore, are much more limited. I shall attempt to show, contrary to Williams's main thesis, that there is, or rather are, coherent ways of stating what differentiates the two theories. I shall proceed by first pointing out a strong prima facie ground for believing that a distinction between the two

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Section: A Is R 1 and B Is Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: A Is R 1 and B Is Rmentioning

confidence: 99%

Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?

Oaklander¹

2001

Journal of Philosophical Research

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“…Philosophically, this concept was elaborated at the beginning of the last century by philosopher John McTaggart in his A-theory (or tensed theory) of time (McTaggart, 1908). According to this theory, all events are characterized in terms of their temporal specification, namely as being past, present, or future (Oaklander, 1996). We perceive events (instances in time) approaching from the future, passing by in the present, and receding into the past (time-moving metaphor); also, we perceive objects (including our sense of self) travelling through time from past to future (ego-moving metaphor) (McGlone and Harding, 1998;Thönes and Stocker, 2019).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Time Perception through the Processing of Verb Tenses: An ERP study regarding Mental Time Travel

Papageorgiou

Giannopoulos

Fokas

et al. 2020

Preprint

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Humans are equipped with the so-called Mental Time Travel (MTT) ability, which allows them to consciously construct and elaborate past or future scenes. The mechanisms underlying MTT remain elusive. This study focused on the late positive potential (LPP) and alpha oscillations, considering that LPP covaries with the temporal continuity whereas the alpha oscillations index the temporal organization of perception. To that end, subjects were asked to focus on performing two mental functions engaging working memory, which involved mental self-projection into either the present-past (PP) border or the present-future (PF) border. To evaluate underlying mechanisms, the evoked frontal late positive potentials (LPP) as well as their cortical sources were analyzed via the standardized low-resolution brain electromagnetic tomography (sLORETA) technique. The LPP amplitudes - in the left lateral prefrontal areas that were elicited during PF tasks - were significantly higher than those associated with PP, whereas opposite patterns were observed in the central and right prefrontal areas. Crucially, the LPP activations of both the PP and PF self-projections overlapped with the brain’s default mode network and related interacting areas. Finally, we found enhanced alpha-related activation with respect to PP in comparison to PF, predominantly over the right hemisphere central brain regions (specifically, the precentral gyrus). These findings confirm that the two types of self-projection, as reflected by the frontally-distributed LPP, share common cortical resources that recruit different brain regions in a balanced way. This balanced distribution of brain activation might signify that biological time tends to behave in a homeostatic way.

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“…For a complete discussion of my interpretation of McTaggart's positive and negative accounts of time see(Oaklander 2004d).…”

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confidence: 99%

McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism

Oaklander

2009

Philosophia

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In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews, 2005a) argues that Oaklander's version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument. I shall proceed as follows. In Part I I shall explain Crisp's view and then argue in Part II that his analysis of temporal becoming, temporal properties and temporal relations is inadequate. Finally, in Part III, I shall demonstrate that his presentist ontology of time is susceptible to the paradox he so assiduously sought to avoid. Keywords McTaggart . Presentism . Time . Ersatz B-relations . Temporal becoming In his review of The Ontology of Time, Thomas Crisp (2005a) argues that Oaklander's (2004a, b, c) version of McTaggart's paradox does not make any trouble for his version of presentism. The aim of this paper is to refute that claim by demonstrating that Crisp's version of presentism does indeed succumb to a version of McTaggart's argument.The standard way of understanding McTaggart is first to assert that events require the A-properties of pastness, presentness and futurity in order for there to be change, and then claim that those properties are incompatible: if an event is present then it cannot be past or future; if it is past then it cannot be present or future and if it is future then it cannot be present or past. Yet every event has all three incompatible characteristics and for that reason change is contradictory, and since time requires change it too is contradictory and hence unreal. 1

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McTaggart's paradox and Smith's tensed theory of time

Cited by 13 publications

References 24 publications

Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?

Is There a Difference Between the Metaphysics of A- and B-Time?

Time Perception through the Processing of Verb Tenses: An ERP study regarding Mental Time Travel

McTaggart’s Paradox and Crisp’s Presentism

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