Meaning and Mind from the Perspective of Dualist versus Relational Worldviews: Implications for the Development of Pointing Gestures

Abstract

Worldviews consist of preconceptions about the nature of mind, knowledge, and meaning, and these assumptions influence theorizing about human development and the interpretation of research. We outline two contrasting worldviews - dualist versus relational - and explicate the implications of such preconceptions for studying the development of pointing gestures. Pointing is a pivotal social skill that is an aspect of social understanding, as well as a foundational form of interaction for language. In studying the development of pointing it is possible to observe how infants develop the social skills required to convey meaning in human ways. Thus, this is an area in which to examine the nature and development of meaning, and an adequate conception of meaning is necessary for theories of language and cognition. We argue that dualist approaches have problems that can be avoided by adopting a relational worldview and the relational developmental systems framework that follows from it, which we suggest is a fruitful approach to theorizing about human development.

Taking Natural History Seriously in Studying the Social Formation of Thinking

“…This again makes development a key issue because, when we consider infants in the process of developing gestures, such skills do not seem possible. This is why Tomasello needs a simulation approach to infant development [Tomasello et al, 2005], but such an account is missing from the current book, and his explanation is problematic [Carpendale et al, 2013a]. Tomasello [2014] begins from the idea that common ground is needed for communication, and he refers to Wittgenstein [1968], particularly the latter's point that "the appropriate use of a linguistic convention or cultural rule depends on a preexisting set of shared social practices and judgments ('forms of life')" (p. 2).…”

“…However, given the preconceptions that Tomasello starts with, he faces a paradox. We will consider his arguments and claims in exploring why it is important to do more than pay lip service to ontogeny [Carpendale, Atwood, & Kettner, 2013a;Carpendale, Hammond, & Atwood, 2013b;Carpendale & Lewis, 2015b].…”

“…But that part of the story is missing from this book. The problem with his simulation view of human development is that, although infants have immediate experience, it is not reflective and therefore cannot be applied to understanding others [Carpendale et al, 2013a]. It might appear that Tomasello has changed his mind on this position, but he still defends it [Tomasello & Carpenter, 2013].…”

“…One way to understand this apparent difficulty in Tomasello's position is that he assumes that infant social development occurs through the simulation process he describes [Tomasello et al, 2005]. This, however, gets us into the problems of circularity described above [Carpendale et al, 2013a]. From the relational developmental systems approach to cooperation sketched in the previous section, communication is instead a different way of talking about cooperation.…”

The Meaning of<b><i> Hope</i></b>: Developmental Origins in Early Childhood

“…When children's understanding of the mind is viewed as theory-like, then development involves learning that mental states are interrelated, internal, and causally related to external phenomena [e.g., Gopnik & Wellman, 2012]. Children identify mental states in self and other, label them, and learn how those mental states reliably predict and explain behavior [for a discussion, see Carpendale, Atwood, & Kettner, 2014].…”