Means of production versus means of coercion: can Russian business limit the violence of a predatory state?

Abstract

Cambridge University Press) name the formation of organizations capable of effectively restricting violence in society as a necessary condition for transition from developing societies to societies with sustainable economic growth. However, the mechanisms of emergence and conditions for the operation of such organizations in contemporary developing countries remain unclear. We follow the logic of formation of such organizations using the case study of collective actions of the Russian business community aimed at restricting "state violence" against business. We seek to identify the conditions leading to a shift in the choice of strategies from attempts at informal agreements with extortionists controlling means of coercion to cooperation of businessmen and trace the further evolution of organized forms of collective action. Finally, we assess to what extent the created organizations can be efficient and self-supporting in the long term.

Informality trap: a foundation of Russia’s statist-patrimonial capitalism

“…4. An exception to this view is provided by scholars who study relatively rare business strategies to resist state predation, for example through collective organisations (Yakovlev et al, 2014) or mobilising relevant stakeholders (Markus, 2015). 5.…”

“…In particular, an important factor is the lack of institutional constraints on sovereign predation (e.g. Dawisha, 2014;Hanson, 2007;Yakovlev, Sobolev, & Kazun, 2014), or, more generally, a traditional preponderance of state power resources such as coercion and capital in relation to society (e.g. Easter, 2013;Pipes, 1999).…”

Governors matter

“…Given further empirical explorations into vote mobilization techniques in Russia, we suggest, with a reasonable degree of confidence, that regional business environment and institutional quality are not associated with vote mobilization and therefore cannot be expected to influence gubernatorial tenure (Frye et al ., ). Additionally, empirical evidence shows that regional businesses’ mobilization capacity is heavily circumscribed by the state authorities (Yakovlev et al ., ), which makes the potential reverse causality associated with business actors reacting to sub‐par business climate and affecting administrative continuity unlikely.…”

“…A good place to start the analysis is to observe that the defining and well-documented feature of Russian regional economic activities is a very strong mutual dependence between economic and political actors (Frye, 2002;Sharafutdinova, 2010;Slinko et al, 2005;Stoner-Weiss, 2002;Yakovlev, 2006). The balance of power between the business and the state has shifted in the last decade and a half, in favour of the state revealing the effectiveness of president Vladimir Putin's policies aimed at strengthening the executive vertical of power (Gans-Morse, 2012;Rochlitz, 2014;Yakovlev et al, 2014). This points to the importance of the institution of the governor and his team in establishing a specific mode of relationship with regional businesses, mechanisms of exchange and other rules of state-business interaction that contribute to a predictable business environment in the region.…”

How (not) to measure Russian regional institutions

“…Another similar source is media coverage of raider attacks in various regions of Russia (Rochlitz, 2014). The disadvantages of such indicators are their possible bias due to uneven media development and them (Yakovlev et al, 2014).…”