Epistemic and deontic comparatives differ in how they interact with disjunction. I argue that this difference provides a compelling empirical argument against the semantics of Kratzer, which predicts that all modal comparatives should interact with disjunction in the same way. Interestingly, an identical distinction is found in the semantics of non-modal adjectives: additive adjectives like 'heavy' behave logically like epistemic comparatives, and intermediate adjectives like 'hot' behave like deontic comparatives. I characterize this distinction formally and argue that the divergence between epistemic and deontic modals explained if we structure their semantics around scalar concepts: epistemic modals should be analyzed using probability (an additive scale), and deontic modals using expected value (an intermediate scale).A prominent line of research takes it both possible and desirable to provide a unified semantics for deontic, epistemic, and other modal notions (Kratzer, 1977(Kratzer, , 1981(Kratzer, , 1991(Kratzer, , 2012. In the first part of the paper I present a puzzle about variable interaction with disjunction that appears to call the feasibility of this project into question, and then point out a related distinction between two kinds of adjectival scales: additive and intermediate. I'll then suggest a way to maintain an overall unified approach using tools developed for non-modal adjectives: we can adopt recent proposals to treat both kinds of modals as having a semantics build around degree scales rather than (or at least in addition to) quantification over worlds. This discussion has both negative and positive implications. On the negative side, it reveals some empirical problems with received theories of the semantics of modal language. On the positive side, it suggests a way to repair these problems by treating the semantics of scalar Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 95 (2014)