Measurement and analysis of the compromising electromagnetic emanations from USB keyboard

Sim, Dong-ju; Lee, Ho Seong; Yook, Jong-Gwan; Sim, Kyuhong

doi:10.1109/apemc.2016.7522785

Cited by 7 publications

(4 citation statements)

References 1 publication

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“…Therefore, such displays become sources of unwanted emissions. They can be modified limiting the level of sensitivity to electromagnetic infiltration [20][21][22][23]. However, such projects are expensive and not always feasible.…”

Section: Printer Displaysmentioning

confidence: 99%

Possibilities of Electromagnetic Penetration of Displays of Multifunction Devices

2020

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A protection of information against electromagnetic penetration is very often considered in the aspect of the possibility of obtaining data contained in printed documents or displayed on screen monitors. However, many printing devices are equipped with screens based on LED technology or liquid crystal displays. Options enabling the selection of parameters of the printed document, technical settings of the device (e.g., screen activity time) are the most frequently displayed information. For more extensive displays, more detailed information appears, which may contain data that are not always irrelevant to third parties. Such data can be: names of printed documents (or documents registered and available on the internal media), service password access, user names or regular printer user activity. The printer display can be treated as a source of revealing emissions, like a typical screen monitor. The emissions correlated with the displayed data may allow us to obtain the abovementioned information. The article includes analyses of various types of computer printer displays. The tests results of the existing threat are presented in the form of reconstructed images that show the possibility of reading the text data contained in them.

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Section: Printer Displaysmentioning

confidence: 99%

Possibilities of Electromagnetic Penetration of Displays of Multifunction Devices

2020

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“…Another type of method is based on the analysis of the signal through an oscilloscope to interpret the time domain waveform of the intercepted EM information and restore the information [20]. Hyo-Joon Choi et al [21] measured the EM radiation of a USB keyboard using an antenna with a receiver and successfully restored the keystroke information with a signal processing algorithm. In 2018, Alexandru Boitan [22] et al reverse-decoded the collected leakage signal and restored the keystroke information by analyzing the transmission protocol of the USB keyboard, the encoding method.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

A Signal-Denoising Method for Electromagnetic Leakage from USB Keyboards

Peng,

Zhang,

Mao

et al. 2023

Electronics

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USB keyboards are commonly used as computer input devices and inevitably generate electromagnetic (EM) leakage signals during their operation, which carry input information. However, due to the weak energy of a keyboard’s EM signal and the small amount of effective information, the received leakage signal is often characterized by a low signal-to-noise ratio (SNR). This low SNR affects the subsequent detection and restoration of the information. In order to solve this problem, this paper proposes a denoising method for USB keyboard EM leakage signals and designs a self-attentive denoising adversarial network (SADAN) based on generative adversarial networks (GANs). The denoiser continuously enhances the denoising ability during the generative adversarial process, and the self-attention mechanism enables it to better learn the dependencies of the keyboard EM leak signal sequences, modelling the long-range relationships between the sequence sample points and reducing the impact of the number of network layers on the relationship acquisition. The method achieves noise suppression in the keyboard leakage signal, improving its SNR while preserving the effective information in the leakage signal and finally obtaining a denoised leakage signal that can be effectively restored to the information.

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“…The printed image can be easily reconstructed using leaked electromagnetic radiation that came from a laser printer [5]. Leaked electromagnetic radiation from the cable of the USB keyboard was measured by using a field probe and recovery of the data was performed through it [6]. A display image was reconstructed based on the measured time changes in the electromagnetic radiation carrying the signals for drawing the display on touch screen devices such as tablets and smart phones [7].…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Multibyte Electromagnetic Analysis Based on Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm

et al. 2021

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This paper focuses on electromagnetic information security in communication systems. Classical correlation electromagnetic analysis (CEMA) is known as a powerful way to recover the cryptographic algorithm’s key. In the classical method, only one byte of the key is used while the other bytes are considered as noise, which not only reduces the efficiency but also is a waste of information. In order to take full advantage of useful information, multiple bytes of the key are used. We transform the key into a multidimensional form, and each byte of the key is considered as a dimension. The problem of the right key searching is transformed into the problem of optimizing correlation coefficients of key candidates. The particle swarm optimization (PSO) algorithm is particularly more suited to solve the optimization problems with high dimension and complex structure. In this paper, we applied the PSO algorithm into CEMA to solve multidimensional problems, and we also add a mutation operator to the optimization algorithm to improve the result. Here, we have proposed a multibyte correlation electromagnetic analysis based on particle swarm optimization. We verified our method on a universal test board that is designed for research and development on hardware security. We implemented the Advanced Encryption Standard (AES) cryptographic algorithm on the test board. Experimental results have shown that our method outperforms the classical method; it achieves approximately 13.72% improvement for the corresponding case.

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Measurement and analysis of the compromising electromagnetic emanations from USB keyboard

Cited by 7 publications

References 1 publication

Possibilities of Electromagnetic Penetration of Displays of Multifunction Devices

Possibilities of Electromagnetic Penetration of Displays of Multifunction Devices

A Signal-Denoising Method for Electromagnetic Leakage from USB Keyboards

Multibyte Electromagnetic Analysis Based on Particle Swarm Optimization Algorithm

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