2003
DOI: 10.2307/3147021
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Measuring the Opportunity Cost of Carbon Sequestration in Tropical Agriculture

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Cited by 21 publications
(8 citation statements)
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“…Delaware is one of the participants in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which is a cooperative effort of ten states from northeast and Mid-Atlantic to cap and trade carbon emissions [24]. This too can help in the economy of the region [25].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Delaware is one of the participants in the Regional Greenhouse Gas Initiative, which is a cooperative effort of ten states from northeast and Mid-Atlantic to cap and trade carbon emissions [24]. This too can help in the economy of the region [25].…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…At farm level, where important ALUC decisions are taken, farmers face a trade-off between land conservation and short-term land productivity (Zelek and Shively 2003). Economists also argue that environmental externalities of tree cultivation increase the gap between the private and social cost of land uses (Alix-Garcia and Wolff 2014;Sobool 2004), creating inefficiencies in land allocation.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 98%
“…Subsequent studies included the opportunity costs of forgone agricultural uses and constructed cost schedules to estimate the average annual costs and potential carbon benefits of establishing forests (e.g., see [7]). According to the literature above, most studies did not consider the effect of the penalty for the farmers who harvest forests before the contract year, and mainly, if not solely, considered the private opportunity cost of afforestation for deciding the carbon payment; their goal is to ensure the effectiveness of the policy (e.g., see [6], [13]). Huang and Kronrad [6] applied Faustmann formula [4] to compute the land expectation values (LEV) of the optimal private rotation period and that of the rotation period maximizing average annual harvest of timber; the difference is then given to the landowner as compensation for extending the rotation period from the private optimal one to the one with maximum carbon sequestration.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…The social benefits consists of private as well as external benefits, but their studies consider only the benefit of carbon sequestration but no timber value in the computation of the optimal rotation period. Zelek and Shively [13] suggested that the carbon payment should be decided by minimizing the government expenditure such that some predetermined carbon sequestration level can be achieved. They proposed that the minimization of the government expenditure and the amount of carbon payment should be determined in a manner of competitive bidding by the landowners.…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%