Mechanics of Intra-Industry Trade and FTA Implications for India in RCEP

Das, Ram Upendra; Dubey, Jay Dev

doi:10.2139/ssrn.2430185

Cited by 5 publications

(3 citation statements)

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“…India's trade deficit with China accounts for nearly half of its total deficit(Mishra 2018).271 Critics such as India's Foreign Secretary S Jaishankar (quoted in Kaushik 2018) suspects that RCEP is at odds with the government's 'Make In India' campaign. On the contrary, the present study and research by others(Das and Dubey 2014) project that India would enjoy a manufacturing boom under RCEP, see Table3.9.272Ciuriak (2016) discusses how India could make best use of mega-regionals to its own advantage. In the article, the author argues that India should respond to mega-regionalism by, for instance, strengthening its internal market, focusing on the role of government, and facilitating technology acquisition.…”

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confidence: 51%

Competitive mega-regionalism : the trilateral geo-economic power play by the United States of America, China and the European Union

Ji¹

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CHAPTER IAdministration underscoring the impossibility of a US return to the TPP, the remaining 11 signatories moved on to sign a renamed and surgically trimmed-down Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP) without the US in March 2018 in the Chilean capital of Santiago. A total of 22 (relatively minor) provisions from the original TPP agreement (New Zealand Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade 2018b) will not have effect on the CPTPP parties (but they could be reinstated at a later date) 9 . The CPTPP can be provisionally applied 9 The following changes are made to the CPTPP. 1) Article 3 of Annex 26A is suspended. The provision that would have required national pharmaceutical management agencies to make administrative changes to primarily benefit the pharmaceutical industry has been suspended.2) In the Investment chapter, six articles and Annex 9-L are suspended, curbing businesses' ability to sue government for investment contract breaches. 3) Article 11.2.2(b), the phrase 'Article 9.6 (Minimum Standard of Treatment)' and Annex 11-E are suspended. 4) Article 18.63 is suspended, meaning countries will no longer be required to extend the term of protection for copyright from 50 years to 70 years. 5) and 6) Articles 18.50 and 18.51 are suspended. There are no data or market protection obligations for new medicines, including biologics. 7) Article 18.37 paragraph 2 and the last sentence of Article 18.37.4 are suspended to afford more flexibility around what is patentable. 8) and 9) Articles 18.46 and 18.48 are suspended. CPTPP countries will not have to change their laws to enable people to apply for an extension of the term of a patent following unreasonable delays. 10) Article 15.8.5 is suspended. The suspension means government are not legally required to promote compliance with international labour rights as part of their procurement processes. 11) Article 15.24.2 phrase 'No later than three years after the date of entry into force of this Agreement' is suspended, meaning further negotiations to expand government procurement coverage will be delayed. 12) and 13) Article 18.68 and Article 18.69 are suspended. Countries will not have to provide more extensive protection to 'technological protection measures' and 'rights management information'. 14) Article 18.82, Annex 18-E and Annex 18-F are suspended. Countries retain the right to adjust rules for liability of internet service providers for on-line copyright infringement. 15) Article 18.79 is suspended, meaning countries will not have to provide more extensive protection for encrypted programme-carrying satellite and cable programme signals. 16) Article 20.17.5 phrase 'or another applicable law' is suspended. The suspended language would have required countries to act to address violations to the wildlife trafficking laws of countries that were not party to the CPTPP. 17) Article 5.7.1(f) second sentence is suspended. CPTPP countries retain the right to regulate and review customs duties for express shipments. 18) Articl...

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Competitive mega-regionalism : the trilateral geo-economic power play by the United States of America, China and the European Union

Ji¹

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“…Yet, India's exit has reflected some deep-rooted problems with RCEP and its member countries, as well as the dilemma faced by member countries in the direction of regional economic cooperation, which may be the more important issues for us to reflect on and strive to solve in the long term. More importantly, India's long-standing ambivalence in the RCEP negotiations and its decision to withdraw from RCEP essentially has reflected the "social dilemma" in the Asia-Pacific regional cooperation process 42 , namely the dilemma of choosing between maximizing individual interests and maximizing group interests faced by RCEP member countries with common interests and long-term interactions in the Asia-Pacific, a network of intertwined and complex dynamic international relations 43 . Therefore, the key to getting out of the dilemma of Asia-Pacific regional cooperation and steadily pushing ahead with RCEP negotiations lies in how to transform countries that seek to maximize their own interests and may choose to betray their partners at any time into countries that are willing to cooperate with each other for the sake of mutual benefits and win-win outcomes, and are willing to give up or sacrifice some short-term individual interests for the long-term common good of other partners and groups.…”

Section: Discussionmentioning

confidence: 99%

India’s Withdrawal from the RCEP Negotiations: A Chinese Perspective

Fangfei

2020

J Int Polit

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India's participation in the RCEP negotiations has gone through a "tangled" process from "indecision" to "active advancement" to "announcement of withdrawal". This process has not only reflected the recent sharp change in India's stance and attitude towards RCEP under the Modi administration, but also reflected the fact that India has been hesitant about its RCEP policy for a long time. Generally speaking, India's interest in RCEP mainly attributes to the potential long-term economic, political and strategic benefits of joining RCEP, as well as the fact that RCEP meets the status and needs of India's socio-economic development better than other regional trade agreements, such as TPP. However, affected by factors such as relatively high short-term economic costs, disadvantages in relative returns in comparison with other RCEP members, domestic political pressure, strategic adjustment of the US in Asia-Pacific, shortcomings of the RCEP, as well as insufficient mutual trust among member countries, India has not been able to dispel doubts and be prepared to join RCEP physically and psychologically. As the RCEP issue becomes highly politicized domestically and the regional situation changes drastically under the "Trump shocks", the interest preferences of the Modi administration have undergone significant changes in the international-domestic dual game. This is the main reason for India's decision on withdrawing from the RCEP.

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“…Since the inception of the negotiations, there has been a debate on the likely impact of joining the RCEP on the Indian economy. Several studies have highlighted the benefits for India under the RCEP as it would have provided access to new markets, enhanced integration in the global value chains, increase in foreign investment and trade in services and GDP growth (Das & Dubey, 2014; HLAG, 2019; Hsu, 2013;; Mahadevan & Nugroho, 2019; Zhao et al, 2021). Even gradual reforms in the agricultural sector were touted as gain for India upon joining the RCEP (Elms & Tran, 2014).…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Evaluating the Reasons for India’s Withdrawal from RCEP: A General Equilibrium Analysis

Sharma

Narayanan

Dobhal

2023

The Indian Economic Journal

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This study identifies and rationalises some of India’s issues and concerns with the signing of the RCEP. By analysing the existing trade balance, import surge trends, dumping and agricultural sensitivities, among other factors, the study justifies India’s decision to remain outside of this mega-FTA. Further, it predicts the impact of tariff elimination under RCEP on various macroeconomic variables of the RCEP member countries by using the GTAP model under two scenarios: (i) India does not join the RCEP and (ii) India joins the RCEP. Results show that India’s GDP would be adversely affected if it joins this agreement, and its overall trade deficit may further deteriorate after joining the RCEP. In terms of the bilateral trade balance, India’s trade deficit with ASEAN and China will grow steeply if it joins the agreement. The study also finds that an RCEP without India may lose its shine as the GDP of most of the other members of the RCEP would be negatively impacted by India’s decision to stay out. JEL Codes: F13, F15, F17, F61, O53

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Mechanics of Intra-Industry Trade and FTA Implications for India in RCEP

Cited by 5 publications

References 52 publications

Competitive mega-regionalism : the trilateral geo-economic power play by the United States of America, China and the European Union

Competitive mega-regionalism : the trilateral geo-economic power play by the United States of America, China and the European Union

India’s Withdrawal from the RCEP Negotiations: A Chinese Perspective

Evaluating the Reasons for India’s Withdrawal from RCEP: A General Equilibrium Analysis

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