Mechanism Design for Allocation of Carbon Emission Reduction Units: A Study of Global Companies with Strategic Divisions and Partners

Bagchi, Deepak; Lakshmi, L. Udaya; Narahari, Y.; Biswas, Sourav; Suresh, P.; Subrahmanya, S. V.; Viswanadham, N.

doi:10.1007/978-94-007-5995-4_3

Cited by 5 publications

(2 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…In [Bagchi et al 2012], we considered the strategic version and proposed a mechanism that a global company may use in allocating emission reductions to its different divisions and supply chain partners towards achieving a required target in its carbon footprint reduction program. The proposed mechanism is strategy-proof and allocatively efficient and uses redistribution mechanisms.…”

Section: Our Contributions and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon footprint optimization

et al. 2012

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We discuss four problems that we have identified under the umbrella of carbon economics problems: carbon credit allocation (CCA), carbon credit buying (CCB), carbon credit selling (CCS), and carbon credit exchange (CCE). Because of the strategic nature of the players involved in these problems, game theory and mechanism design provides a natural way of formulating and solving these problems. We then focus on a particular CCA problem, the carbon emission reduction problem, where the countries or global industries are trying to reduce their carbon footprint at minimum cost. We briefly describe solutions to the above problem.

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Section: Our Contributions and Resultsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Carbon footprint optimization

et al. 2012

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“…Our paper is mainly about the allocation of carbon emission abatement target. Bagchi et al considered the issue of emission abatement allocation among the partners to achieve the required abatement target over the supply chain [35]. Feng et al provided improved DEA-based centralized allocation models under the assumptions of constant returnsto-scale and variable returns-to-scale, respectively, and two compensation schemes for centralized allocation plans were developed [36].…”

Section: A Carbon Emission Abatementmentioning

confidence: 99%

Optimal Pricing and Carbon Emission Abatement Allocation Decisions in Supply Chains With Option Contract

Wei

Tang

2020

IEEE Access

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With the continuous increase of carbon emissions and the deterioration of environment, governments have passed various laws and regulations to force enterprises to take carbon emission abatement measures. As one of the regulations, carbon tax plays an important and positive role in environmental protection. For enterprises, the allocation of carbon emission abatement is a common means to promote emission reduction. In this paper, under the uncertain market demand, the option contract is adopted to study the retailer's optimal retail price and order quantity, as well as the manufacturer's optimal ratio of total carbon emission abatement and production quantity under the carbon tax. In addition, We analyze the optimal decisions and expected profits of supply chain members with respect to the carbon tax, total carbon emission abatement and option prices by analytical and numerical study, and find that (1) when the carbon tax increases, the optimal ratio of total carbon emission abatement and the optimal retail price increase, while the optimal order and production quantity decrease, which is contrary to the situation of the total carbon emission abatement; (2) when the option prices increase, the optimal retail price increases while the ratio of total carbon emission abatement and the optimal order and production quantity decrease; (3) the expected profits of the manufacturer and retailer show the same trend with the increase of carbon tax and total carbon emission abatement, while have the opposite trend with the increase of option prices. INDEX TERMS Supply chain management, optimization, sustainable development, carbon tax, contacts, option contract.

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Introduction to Mechanism Design for Sustainability

Luo

2013

Mechanism Design for Sustainability

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Mechanism Design for Allocation of Carbon Emission Reduction Units: A Study of Global Companies with Strategic Divisions and Partners

Cited by 5 publications

References 15 publications

Carbon footprint optimization

Carbon footprint optimization

Optimal Pricing and Carbon Emission Abatement Allocation Decisions in Supply Chains With Option Contract

Introduction to Mechanism Design for Sustainability

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