2020
DOI: 10.48550/arxiv.2012.00952
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Mechanism Design for Demand Management in Energy Communities

Abstract: We consider a demand management problem of an energy community, in which several users obtain energy from an external organization such as an energy company, and pay for the energy according to pre-specified prices that consist of a time-dependent price per unit of energy, as well as a separate price for peak demand. Since users' utilities are private information which they may not be willing to share, a mediator, known as the planner, is introduced to help optimize the overall satisfaction of the community (t… Show more

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Cited by 1 publication
(2 citation statements)
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“…Recent years have witnessed increasing efforts in generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP) [2], [3], motivated by numerous applications, e.g., communication networks [4], charge scheduling of electric vehicles [5], formation control [6], and demand management in the smart grid [7]. In many cases, multiple self-interested players/decision-makers aim to optimize their individual objectives under some global resource limits while unwilling to share their private information with the public.…”
Section: Imentioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…Recent years have witnessed increasing efforts in generalized Nash equilibrium problems (GNEP) [2], [3], motivated by numerous applications, e.g., communication networks [4], charge scheduling of electric vehicles [5], formation control [6], and demand management in the smart grid [7]. In many cases, multiple self-interested players/decision-makers aim to optimize their individual objectives under some global resource limits while unwilling to share their private information with the public.…”
Section: Imentioning
confidence: 99%
“…Notice that in the original game formulation (1), − is treated as a parametric input in player 's local optimization problem. In (7), other players' decision vectors − are replaced with − ; hence − is also treated as a parameter in the objective function .…”
Section: B Networked Game Formulationmentioning
confidence: 99%