Mechanism design with ambiguous transfers: An analysis in finite dimensional naive type spaces

Approximate Bayesian implementation and exact maxmin implementation: An equivalence

“…This is a sorting condition familiar from mechanism design which allows us to rank social alternatives according to an agent's marginal valuation. 24 It is easily seen that linear models satisfy supermodularity. Lemma 4.1 is a corollary of the next more general result.…”

“…To see why overreporting cost is actually lying downward, note that for a seller j with cost c j , his valuation from trading is given by −c j . Given our assumption that each agent's valuation increases in his signal, technically, seller j's signal is −c j 24. A similar assumption is adopted in Bergemann and Välimäki[4, Condition (18)].…”

“…See Renou[41] and Song[47] for an analysis of mechanism design problems with ambiguity averse agents and correlated information 35. Di Tillio et al[15] and Guo[24] study the effects of introducing ambiguity in mechanisms.…”

Characterization of equilibrium existence and purification in general Bayesian games

“…12 Players' types may contain not only the payoff-relevant information, but also the payoff-irrelevant information. For example, the beliefs may differ given distinct types, and thus one could be able to design mechanisms eliciting players' beliefs about others; see Cremer and McLean (1988), Heifetz and Neeman (2006), Chen andXiong (2013), andGuo (2019) for more discussions.…”

Maxmin implementation

“…The ambiguity comes from either exogenous assumptions or endogenous ambiguous communication devices (Bose and Renou, 2014). Guo (2019) studies full surplus extraction by allowing for ambiguity in transfer schemes, and the characterization relies on correlated type distributions among agents. As a result, the framework in those papers does not naturally include the single-agent case, over which our framework still has some leverage.…”