MENA Quarterly Economic Brief, July 2015: Economic Implications of Lifting Sanctions on Iran

Devarajan, Shantayanan; Mottaghi, Lili

doi:10.1596/978-1-4648-0702-2

Cited by 8 publications

(7 citation statements)

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“…The underlying question of our research is motivated by the projections that are reported by Devarajan and Mottaghi (2015) and Felbermayr et al (2019). Highlighting the significance of trade deflection, Devarajan and Mottaghi (2015) show that sanctions against Iran led to a significant loss of export revenue from 2012 to 2014.…”

Section: Trade Effects Of Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Agreements and Exporting Activities: An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of the JCPOA Agreement on Iran’s Exports

Dadpay

Tabrizy

2020

Comp Econ Stud

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Conflicts hinder international trade. Political agreements that restrain conflicts and remove sanctions may contribute positively to exporting and importing activities. In this study, we examine the effects of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, commonly known as Iran Nuclear Deal, on Iran's non-oil exports. Employing a dynamic panel model, we find a significant increase in the growth rate of industry-level exports following the removal of nuclear-related sanctions, resulting from this political agreement. In particular, the exports of industries that have relatively low shares in Iran's non-oil exports grow significantly faster than industries with relatively high shares in those exports. Our findings suggest that even a short-lived political agreement could have significant positive effects on exporting activities in middle income countries.

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Section: Trade Effects Of Sanctionsmentioning

confidence: 99%

Political Agreements and Exporting Activities: An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of the JCPOA Agreement on Iran’s Exports

Dadpay

Tabrizy

2020

Comp Econ Stud

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“…(2016) measured how much the sanctions would affect Iranian exports. These studies estimated that sanctions reduced Iranian exports about 33% each year (Devarajan andMattaghi 2015: 1-46, Shirazi et. al.…”

Section: Literature Reviewmentioning

confidence: 99%

İran Yaptırımlarının Kaldırılması: Türkiye için Fırsat mı Tehdit mi?

Ay¹

2019

Bilig

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After the removal of sanctions against Iran, foreign investors' interest in Iran, where cheap labor force and attractive investment incentives are located, is regarded as a commercial threat for Turkey. Conversely, Turkey has important opportunities to increase its trade with Iran due shared borders and their trade agreements. In view of this perspective, it is aimed to examine Turkey's trade with Iran in order to evaluate the opportunities after the removal of sanctions. For this purpose, Iranian trade with Turkey, European Union (EU), United States (USA), Russia and China have been examined using Gravity Model for 1990-2016 period. It has seen that Turkey has a great commercial opportunity compared to the countries mentioned from the analysis results. The analyses have indicated that it is necessary for Turkey to increase its economic relations in order to be able to evaluate its trade opportunities with Iran.

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“…We now know that sanctions, particularly the denial of Iranian access to SWIFT, produced chronic shortages and an inability to access its foreign currency in Iranian territory. The imposition of sanctions in 2012 led to a loss of $17.1 billion in export revenue from 2012 to 2014, the equivalent of 4.5% of Iran’s GDP, and the economy contracted at a rate of 6.8% in 2012 (Devarajan and Mottaghi, 2015). However, belligerent statements from both Ahmadinejad and Ayatollah Khameini essentially turned Iran into an international pariah with few allies.…”

Section: Sanctions and The Financing Of Foreign Policy Challengesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing

Cilizoglu

Bapat

2018

Conflict Management and Peace Science

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Although sanctions generate economic costs, target states may “sanctions-proof” their regime by borrowing capital from abroad. While some targets obtain interest-free capital from black knight states, others may need to borrow with interest from international credit markets. These interest rates may sometimes make borrowing cost-prohibitive, giving targets no choice but to acquiesce to the demands of the sender. However, since senders cannot observe if black knight states are assisting target states, targets have an incentive to misrepresent their source of external capital. In an effort to deter sanctions, targets that must borrow at high interest rates may signal that they have black knight support and are sanctions-proofed. We formally and empirically demonstrate that in this uncertain environment, senders are more likely to impose sanctions on targets with low credit ratings, but only do so if the target places a relatively low value on uninterrupted economic transactions with the sender.

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MENA Quarterly Economic Brief, July 2015: Economic Implications of Lifting Sanctions on Iran

Cited by 8 publications

References 0 publications

Political Agreements and Exporting Activities: An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of the JCPOA Agreement on Iran’s Exports

Political Agreements and Exporting Activities: An Empirical Assessment of the Effects of the JCPOA Agreement on Iran’s Exports

İran Yaptırımlarının Kaldırılması: Türkiye için Fırsat mı Tehdit mi?

Economic coercion and the problem of sanctions-proofing

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