Mental Files and Rational Inferences

Onofri, Andrea

doi:10.1080/0020174x.2014.883748

Cited by 5 publications

(6 citation statements)

References 13 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Nowadays referentialists have proposed that although the expressions do not mean anything more than the object referred, different explorers associate to the expressions different mental information (or different clusters of information mentally stored). As they say different singular senses are explained by differences in prompted mental files [29,37,39,[41][42][43][44][45][46][47][48] 22 . In this line, Recanti proposes the following account for indexical senses 23 :…”

Section: Descriptivist Referentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

See 1 more Smart Citation

Does it Make Sense to Ascribe Object-Dependent Senses to Names?

C¹

2021

PhIJ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The aim of this paper is to revise the neo-Fregean notion of non-descriptive object-dependent senses, and to enquire how the notion can be applied to specify the meaning of names. The structure of the paper is the following: Firstly, I present the descriptivist canonical review of the Fregean notion of sense. Secondly, I present a general approximation to the neo-Fregean notion of object-dependent senses. Thirdly, I review Evans's approach to the case of indexical terms, in particular, to 'here' and 'now' terms. Finally, I provide some insights about how the ascription of object-dependent senses can work to the case of names, in particular to the Fregean case of (' Aphla' and ' Ateb') names for perceived objects.

show abstract

Section: Descriptivist Referentialismmentioning

confidence: 99%

“… See Recanati (2009, 2010, 2013, 2016, Murez, M., & Recanati, F. (2016),Murez, et al (2020) Ninan (2015),Onofri (2015),. Jeshion (2010, pp.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Does it Make Sense to Ascribe Object-Dependent Senses to Names?

C¹

2021

PhIJ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…But I am yet to be convinced of their utility. Recanati sometimes seems to assume that fine-grained files are needed in order to deal with Frege cases (see for example the exchange between Recanati (2015) and Onofri (2015)). But this is not correct, much as it would not be correct to hold that physical objects must be individuated in a fine-grained way in order to account for the fact that there can be two distinct physical objects at the same time.…”

Section: The Identity Of Mops Over Time and Between Peoplementioning

confidence: 99%

The Metaphysics of Mental Files

Prosser

2019

Philos Phenomenol Research

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

There is much to be said for a diachronic or interpersonal individuation of singular modes of presentation (MOPs) in terms of a criterion of epistemic transparency between thought tokens. This way of individuating MOPs has been discussed recently within the mental files framework, though the issues discussed here arise for all theories that individuate MOPs in terms of relations among tokens. All such theories face objections concerning apparent failures of the transitivity of the 'same MOP' relation. For mental files, these transitivity failures most obviously occur because mental files can merge or undergo fission. In this paper I argue that this problem is easily resolved once mental files are properly construed as continuants, whose metaphysics is analogous to that of persons or physical objects. All continuants can undergo fission or fusion, leading to similar transitivity problems, but there are well-established theories of persistence that accommodate this. I suggest that, in particular, the stage theory best suits the purposes of a continuant theory of MOPs.

show abstract

“…1515See (Ninan, 2015, p. 369‐73), (Onofri, 2015, p. 380‐4), (Papineau, 2013, p. 167‐70). Also, see (Ball, 2015) for the claim that Recanati's files are temporally too fine‐grained, but Ball's claim is based on a different kind of argument.…”

mentioning

confidence: 99%

Mental filing

Goodman

Gray

2020

Nous

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

We offer an interpretation of the mental files framework that eliminates the metaphor of files, information being contained in files, etc. The guiding question is whether, once we move beyond the metaphors, there is any theoretical role for files. We claim not. We replace the file‐metaphor with two theses: the semantic thesis that there are irreducibly relational representational facts (viz. facts about the coordination of representations); and the metasemantic thesis that processes tied to information‐relations ground those facts. In its canonical statement, the ‘file’‐theory makes reference to a certain kind of relational representational feature, and a certain kind of mental activity. Mental files need not come into it. In short, we posit mental filing without mental files. Our interpretation avoids awkward problems that arise on the standard interpretation and clarifies the explanatory commitments of the theory.

show abstract

Mental Files and Rational Inferences

Cited by 5 publications

References 13 publications

Does it Make Sense to Ascribe Object-Dependent Senses to Names?

Does it Make Sense to Ascribe Object-Dependent Senses to Names?

The Metaphysics of Mental Files

Mental filing

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About