Mental Maps¹

Abstract

It’s often hypothesized that the structure of mental representation is map‐like rather than language‐like. The possibility arises as a counterexample to the argument from the best explanation of productivity and systematicity to the language of thought hypothesis—the hypothesis that mental structure is compositional and recursive. In this paper, I argue that the analogy with maps does not undermine the argument, because maps and language have the same kind of compositional and recursive structure.

Concepts and predication from perception to cognition

“…What's most relevant for present purposes is the particular kind of discursive format such explanations appeal to. Arguably, maps are at least partly discursive in virtue of symbols that function as markers (Blumson, 2012; Camp, 2007; Kulvicki, 2015b). But the format of maps doesn't involve predicate‐argument structure as a sentence does, even if, as some argue, the content of maps is predicative (Casati & Varzi, 1999; Kulvicki, 2015b; cf.…”

Talking our way to systematicity

“…with respect to its unconstrained systematicity-then there is nothing obviously problematic about arguing from 19 Fodor (197519 Fodor ( , 1987b19 Fodor ( , 2008 and Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988). 20 See Aydede (2015), Blumson (2012) and Camp (2007) for representative overviews of this argumentative strategy; and see Fodor and Pylyshyn (1988) and Fodor (1987aFodor ( , b, 2008.…”

(Mind)-Reading Maps

“…This involves the possibility of map-like vehicles to represent recursion. According to some theorists, map-like vehicles are recursive [35]. This is an important question that needs to be addressed in future research.…”