Merit Pay in Academia: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Perceptions

Taylor, Ruth Lesher; Hunnicutt, Garland G.; Keeffe, Michael J.

doi:10.1177/0734371x9101100304

Cited by 13 publications

(5 citation statements)

References 20 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…This necessarily transfers risk to the risk-averse agent'' (Miller 2005: 206). Selective incentives like merit pay in academia-a concept, which by the way can be traced back to the early ninteenth century (see Taylor et al 1991)-are supposed to change the professor's behavior by changing his individual payoff (Kollock 1998). In case of universities, the efficacy of selective incentives is most likely limited by two reasons: (1) It is very difficult for superiors or-in the case of teachingpeers to monitor and reward the performance of professors (Frey and Osterloh 2002).…”

Section: Theoretical Underpinningmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impacts of new governance on teaching at German universities. Findings from a national survey

Wilkesmann

Schmid

2011

High Educ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

In this article we will present findings from a national survey questioning the actual impact of the new governance structures at German universities on academic teaching. To begin with, we give a theoretical underpinning to the economization of higher education institutions (HEIs) according to Principal-Agent Theory. This allows for the development of hypotheses about the influence of new selective incentives (merit pay, performance-related budgeting, Management by Objectives, teaching awards) on the professors' academic teaching behavior. Instructed by critical considerations on PrincipalAgent Theory we extended the axiomatics of this economic theory by incorporating concepts like work task motivation and academic socialization for a supposedly more comprehensive explanation. Data from a nationwide German survey allows us then to test our theory-driven assumptions. Our target population was the entire collectivity of all professors at German universities from which we could draft a sample 8,000 individuals. An estimation of four different OLS-regression models shows that the hypotheses derived from Principal-Agent Theory must be rejected whereas the hypotheses based on motivational aspects and socialization processes can be confirmed. Based on our analysis we can conclude that for the status quo of implementation there are no direct influences of new selective incentives on the actual teaching performance whereas we have strong indications for altered mechanisms of enculturation in the field of universities. New Public Management (NPM) seems to produce a new breed of professors whose preferences and practice are conditioned by the imperatives evoked by this new managerialism.

show abstract

Section: Theoretical Underpinningmentioning

confidence: 99%

The impacts of new governance on teaching at German universities. Findings from a national survey

Wilkesmann

Schmid

2011

High Educ

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

show abstract

“…Performance pay is not a new concept. Legislators have implemented small-scale performance pay programs for teachers since the early 20th century in attempts to reward particularly effective teachers, but the difficulty of measuring teacher effectiveness prevented widespread adoption of performance pay for teachers (Taylor, Hunnicutt, & Keeffe, 1991). In recent years, though, interest in performance pay has resurfaced, in part because of efforts to increase student, teacher, and school accountability.…”

Section: Background and Relevancementioning

confidence: 99%

Understanding Teacher Pay for Performance: Flawed Assumptions and Disappointing Results

Kozlowski

Lauen

2019

Teachers College Record: The Voice of Scholarship in Education

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Background Policy makers are increasingly adopting performance incentives to spur under-performing teachers as a way to improve teaching and student performance. However, much of the experimental research fails to find meaningful effects of performance incentives on either student achievement or teacher practice. Purpose/Objective Using the “principal–agent problem” as the theoretical motivation for the study, this research examines why performance incentives have not worked in American schools. The principal–agent problem suggests that in the absence of a perfect system to monitor agents, (e.g., teachers), there must be an incentive based on some measurable outcome to ensure maximal effort. The underlying assumptions about why performance incentives should work for teachers are that (1) teachers are primarily motivated by money, (2) teachers are not currently working hard enough, and (3) teachers know how to be more effective but are choosing not to put forth the necessary effort to do so. The purpose of this research is to examine whether these assumptions hold for teachers. Research Design We conducted qualitative analysis of interviews and focus groups with approximately 150 teachers and 20 administrators from 13 of the lowest performing school districts in North Carolina to understand how educators perceived performance incentives in the context of their own practice. Findings Three key themes emerged from our study. First, teachers report being motivated by service to their students instead of opportunities to maximize income. Second, teachers think they are already working as hard as they can and find little room in their practice to work harder, whatever the financial reward. Third, when teachers do improve their practice, it comes from opportunities to learn new strategies and techniques. Conclusions The empirical research presented in this paper suggests that performance incentive programs rest on a set of flawed theoretical assumptions. Performance incentives assume that teachers (1) are primarily motivated by financial rewards, (2) are not working as hard as they can, and (3) know how to be more effective. However, these assumptions do not comport with what teachers and administrators report about their motivation and practice. Therefore, performance incentives will likely do little to improve teacher effectiveness overall.

show abstract

“…Research assessment stirs controversy in assessing the quality and impact of publications and the greater professional contribution of certain journals. 24 While overall faculty performance is the criterion guiding merit pay rewards, critics of merit pay plans have suggested that faculty research is disproportionately rewarded while teaching and service activities are not valued commensurate with scholarship. 25 In addition, concerns have been voiced that public university merit pay plans discriminate against specific faculty members.…”

Section: Economic Theoriesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Merit Pay in a Public Higher Education Institution: Questions of Impact and Attitudes

Schulz¹,

Tanguay²

2006

Public Personnel Management

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

The use of merit pay is increasing in public institutions. The prevalence of merit pay has extended to public universities to evaluate faculty performance. A general perception is that faculty scholarship is disproportionably used relative to instructional and service activities in assessing whether merit pay is warranted. Yet, little actual empirical research has been conducted to predict what components of faculty performance lead to merit pay awards. A survey concerning perceptions of faculty performance and subsequent merit pay was distributed to the entire faculty of a large public eastern research university. Logistic regression analysis found faculty research activities were significantly more predictive of merit pay receipt compared to instructional and service performance. Female faculty members were less supportive of merit pay compared to their male colleagues and perceived less improvement in their overall performance post merit pay awards.M erit pay has been a hallmark of pay for performance programs in organizations for years. 1 Merit pay systems are based upon the idea of well-communicated, pre-determined standards providing a greater reward for those performing at a higher level. This link between pay and performance symbolically demonstrates to all employees the organization's commitment to reward top performers. 2 Organization success is enhanced when pay systems support their strategic objectives because pay practices are a visible and effective method to communicate strategic goals to employees. 3, 4 The underlying philosophy of merit pay is to reward outstanding performers with higher base pay rates. This tactic attempts to unite employee interests with that of the organization. Operant conditioning, expectancy, and equity theories represent psychological theories supporting merit pay. Agency, implicit contract, and efficiency wage theories represent economic theories supporting merit pay. A commonality among all theories is that that they purport that linking pay to performance enhances organizational outcomes.

show abstract

Merit Pay in Academia: Historical Perspectives and Contemporary Perceptions

Cited by 13 publications

References 20 publications

The impacts of new governance on teaching at German universities. Findings from a national survey

The impacts of new governance on teaching at German universities. Findings from a national survey

Understanding Teacher Pay for Performance: Flawed Assumptions and Disappointing Results

Merit Pay in a Public Higher Education Institution: Questions of Impact and Attitudes

Contact Info

Product

Resources

About