Metaphors and Martinis: a response to Jessica Keiser

Abstract

This note responds to criticism put forth by Jessica Keiser against a theory of lying as Stalnakerian assertion. According to this account, to lie is to say something one believes to be false and thereby propose that it become common ground. Keiser objects that this view wrongly counts particular kinds of non-literal speech as instances of lying. In particular, Keiser argues that the view invariably counts metaphors and certain uses of definite descriptions as lies. It is argued here that both these claims are false.

Can You Lie Without Intending to Deceive?

“…In other words, I will defend the non-traditional account of lying, L N-T , which does not include the intention to deceive (e.g. Aquinas 1485, article 1;Johnson 1755;Carson 2006Carson , 2010Sorensen 2007Sorensen , 2010Fallis 2009Fallis , 2012Fallis , 2013Fallis , 2015Saul 2012;Stokke 2013Stokke , 2016Stokke , 2017. According to L N-T , I lie to you if and only if I assert what I believe is false.…”

“…Kenyon (2003Kenyon ( , 2010, Staffel (2011, forthcoming), Meibauer (2011Meibauer ( , 2014aMeibauer ( , 2014bMeibauer ( , 2016aMeibauer ( , 2016b, Lackey (2013), Tollefsen (2014), Dynel (2015), Leland (2015), and Keiser (2016). And with some replies from Fallis (2015), Stokke (2017), and Krstić (2017), this debate has become very interesting.…”

“…Kenyon (, ), Staffel (, forthcoming), Meibauer (, , , , ), Lackey (), Tollefsen (), Dynel (), Leland (), and Keiser (). And with some replies from Fallis (), Stokke (), and Krstić (), this debate has become very interesting.…”

“…The Pinocchio cases are all consistent with the view that asserting that p is proposing that p be added to common ground, which is background information shared by participants of the conversation (Stalnaker ). Since you need not believe or know that p or warrant it as true to be able to propose that it be added to common ground in the sense in which this counts as asserting that p (e.g., Stokke , , ), Pinocchio can lie on this account. I now proceed to discuss theories that belong to the Gricean view on assertion.…”

The limits of acceptance

“…Harris, this volume and Keiser (2016).6 My arguments elaborate on some points made inKeiser (2016). SeeStokke (2017) for responses.7 Paraphrased fromStokke (2018) p. 18.…”