Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic

Russell, Gillian

doi:10.1007/s11098-013-0255-y

Cited by 31 publications

(23 citation statements)

References 9 publications

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“…Revision even of the logical law of excluded middle has been proposed as a means of simplifying quantum mechanics, and what difference is there between such a shift and the shift whereby Kepler superseded Ptolemy, or Einstein Newton, or Darwin Aristotle. (Quine 1951, 40) This is anti-exceptionalism about logic, a view more recently defended by Maddy (2002Maddy ( , 2014, Priest (2006a;, Bueno & Colyvan (2004), Russell (2014;, and Williamson (2013a;2013b;. 1 At the heart of the position are three familiar Quinean claims: gradualism, that logical theories are continuous with non-logical scientific theories; revisionism, that logical theories are revisable by pretty much by the same standards as other theories; and nonapriorism, that logical theories ultimately answer to a posteriori evidence.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

Hjortland¹

2019

AJL

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Anti-exceptionalism about logic is the Quinean view that logical theories have no special epistemological status, in particular, they are not self-evident or justified a priori. Instead, logical theories are continuous with scientific theories, and knowledge about logic is as hard-earned as knowledge of physics, economics, and chemistry. Once we reject apriorism about logic, however, we need an alternative account of how logical theories are justified and revised. A number of authors have recently argued that logical theories are justified by abductive argument (e.g. Gillian Russell, Graham Priest, Timothy Williamson). This paper explores one crucial question about the abductive strategy: what counts as evidence for a logical theory? I develop three accounts of evidential confirmation that an anti-exceptionalist can accept: (1) intuitions about validity, (2) the Quine-Williamson account, and (3) indispensability arguments. I argue, against the received view, that none of the evidential sources support classical logic.

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Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 93%

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

Hjortland¹

2019

AJL

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“…(Quine 1986, 100) 2 NB: And by 'logically false', I don't mean contradictory! 3 Some exceptionalists: Boghossian (2000;2003), Dummett (1975;1991), Peacocke (1987;1992;1993), Prawitz (1971;1977), Read (forthcoming), Tennant (1997; 4 Some anti-exceptionalists: Bueno & Colyvan (2004), Maddy (2000;2002), Putnam (1969;1976), Quine (1951Quine ( 19741986), Priest (2006;, Russell (2015), Williamson (2007;. 511…”

Section: Anti-exceptionalismmentioning

confidence: 99%

On the Role of Logic in Analytic Theology: Exploring the Wider Context of Beall’s Philosophy of Logic

Cotnoir

2019

JAT

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What is the proper role of logic in analytic theology? This question is thrown into sharp relief when a basic logical principle is questioned, as in Beall’s ‘Christ – A Contradiction.’ Analytic philosophers of logic have debated between exceptionalism and anti-exceptionalism, with the tide shifting towards anti-exceptionalism in recent years. By contrast, analytic theologians have largely been exceptionalists. The aim of this paper is to argue for an anti-exceptionalist view, specifically treating logic as a modelling tool. Along the way I critically engage with Beall on the role of logic in theology, maintaining that theological inquiry is in some ways disanalogous with other theoretical enterprises.

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“…In recent years, broadly antiexceptionalist positions have been defended by Maddy (2002), Russell (2014Russell ( , 2015, and Williamson (2007Williamson ( , 2013aWilliamson ( , b, 2015. 1 Both Maddy and Williamson are classical anti-exceptionalist: They follow Quine in arguing that anti-exceptionalism provides a justification for classical logic.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Anti-exceptionalism about logic

Hjortland

2016

Philos Stud

107

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Logic isn't special. Its theories are continuous with science; its method continuous with scientific method. Logic isn't a priori, nor are its truths analytic truths. Logical theories are revisable, and if they are revised, they are revised on the same grounds as scientific theories. These are the tenets of anti-exceptionalism about logic. The position is most famously defended by Quine, but has more recent advocates in Maddy (Proc Address Am Philos Williamson (Modal logic as metaphysics, Oxford University Press, Oxford, 2013b, The relevance of the liar, OUP, Oxford, 2015). Although these authors agree on many methodological issues about logic, they disagree about which logic anti-exceptionalism supports. Williamson uses an anti-exceptionalist argument to defend classical logic, while Priest claims that his anti-exceptionalism supports nonclassical logic. This paper argues that the disagreement is due to a difference in how the parties understand logical theories. Once we reject Williamson's deflationary account of logical theories, the argument for classical logic is undercut. Instead an alternative account of logical theories is offered, on which logical pluralism is a plausible supplement to anti-exceptionalism.

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Metaphysical analyticity and the epistemology of logic

Cited by 31 publications

References 9 publications

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

What Counts as Evidence for a Logical Theory?

On the Role of Logic in Analytic Theology: Exploring the Wider Context of Beall’s Philosophy of Logic

Anti-exceptionalism about logic

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