Metasemantics and legal interpretation

Simchen, Ori

doi:10.1017/cbo9781107707573.006

Cited by 2 publications

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References 8 publications

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“…26 Even though our focus here is on singular terms, this is no less true for predicates. See Simchen (2015) for important ramifications of this point for interpretation in general and in legal contexts in particular. 27 How to think of referential intentions and other de re attitudes directed at numbers is vexing.…”

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Metasemantics and Singular Reference*

Simchen

2015

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“…2626Even though our focus here is on singular terms, this is no less true for predicates. See Simchen () for important ramifications of this point for interpretation in general and in legal contexts in particular.…”

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Metasemantics and Singular Reference*

Simchen

2015

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Liberty and the Constitution

Moore

2015

Legal Theory

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The article uses the recent U.S. Supreme Court decision in the same-sex marriage caseObergefell v. Hodgesas the springboard for a general enquiry into the nature and existence of a constitutional right to liberty under the American Constitution. The discussion is divided into two main parts. The first examines the meaning and the justifiability of there being a moral right to liberty as a matter of political philosophy. Two such rights are distinguished and defended: first, a right not to be coerced by the state when the state is motivated by improper reasons (prominent among which are paternalistic reasons); and second, a right not to be coerced by the state when there are insufficient justifying reasons for the state to do so, irrespective of how such state coercion may be motivated. Neither right is regarded as “absolute,” and so it is morally permissible for the state to override such rights in certain circumstances. The second part of the article examines the distinct and additional considerations that must be taken into account when these two moral rights to liberty are fashioned into corresponding legal rights under American constitutional law. Both such rights survive the transformation, but each becomes altered somewhat in its content. This legal transformation includes recognition of the nonabsolute nature of moral rights, such recognition taking the form of some doctrine of “compelling state interests.” The discussion in these two main parts of the article is prefaced with a defense of the article's use of political philosophy to inform constitutional law, a defense motivated by Chief Justice Robert's denunciation of such an approach to constitutional law in his opinion inObergefell.

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Metasemantics and legal interpretation

Cited by 2 publications

References 8 publications

Metasemantics and Singular Reference*

Metasemantics and Singular Reference*

Liberty and the Constitution

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