Methodeutic and the order of inquiry

Abstract

Although C. S. Peirce frequently notes the importance of the branch of logic he designates “rhetoric” or “methodeutic,” he only rarely specifies what this subdivision is meant to involve. This article reassesses the role of methodeutic in Peirce’s classification of the sciences, as well as the methodical significance of this classificatory endeavor itself. The article argues that the classification of sciences is best comprehended as a distinctive phase of methodeutic investigation, which examines actual manifestations of inquiry as well as abstract principles in crafting a normatively guiding conception of the scientific venture. It is further argued that the strict hierarchy on which Peirce bases his classification needs to be tempered to allow for a more flexible ordering, in which so-called “dynamical relationships” between inquiries are considered alongside the top-down perspective of “rational precedence.”

Pragmatism and Logic

“…Bergman (2008: 62-7);Bergman & Gava 2018;Bergman 2018;Gava 2018;Topa 2019. If I understand him well, Bergman's general idea is that speculative rhetoric, but not methodeutic, is concerned with pragmatic (in the sense of linguistic pragmatics) and communicative aspects of sign use, while methodeutic is concerned with scientific methodology.…”