Microfoundations in international relations

Kertzer, Joshua D.

doi:10.1177/0738894216665488

Cited by 76 publications

(38 citation statements)

References 137 publications

(125 reference statements)

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“…Finally, IR scholars have rightly begun to gather empirical evidence at the microlevel to test the mechanisms that make our theories work (Kertzer 2017). We would argue that our results should encourage IR scholars to think seriously and systematically about mesofoundations as well.…”

Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 91%

A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

Kertzer

Zeitzoff

2017

American J Political Sci

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218

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If public opinion about foreign policy is such an elite-driven process, why does the public often disagree with what elites have to say? We argue here that elite cue-taking models in International Relations are both overly pessimistic and unnecessarily restrictive. Members of the public may lack information about the world around them, but they do not lack principles, and information need not only cascade from the top down. We present the results from five survey experiments where we show that cues from social peers are at least as strong as those from political elites. Our theory and results build on a growing number of findings that individuals are embedded in a social context that combines with their general orientations toward foreign policy in shaping responses toward the world around them. Thus, we suggest the public is perhaps better equipped for espousing judgments in foreign affairs than many of our top-down models claim. . Thanks to Kyle Dropp for his assistance with fielding Experiments 1-2. Kertzer acknowledges the support of the Niehaus Center for Globalization and Governance. series of polls found that Democrats and Republicans in the public were divided. In a Pew poll conducted July 24-27, 60% of Republicans blamed Hamas for the violence, whereas Democrats were split, with 29% blaming Hamas, and 26% blaming Israel. A Gallup poll conducted July 22-23 detected a similar pattern: 65% of Republicans thought Israel's actions were justified, but Democrats were divided, as 31% backed the Israeli response, and 47% called it unjustified. This pattern-where political elites are united but the public is divided-is particularly interesting for political scientists because it violates the assumptions of a commonly held theory about public opinion, in which the public knows relatively little about foreign affairs and thus structures its beliefs by taking cues from trusted, partisan elites-a top-down process in which members of the public adeptly swallow whatever their preferred elite cue-givers feed them. Yet if the mass public knows so little and can only regurgitate carefully pureed talking points, why does it often disagree with what elites have to say? We argue here that partisan elite

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Section: Resultsmentioning

confidence: 91%

A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

Kertzer

Zeitzoff

2017

American J Political Sci

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218

100

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“…We believe pursuing microfoundations for reputation costs is thus a valuable enterprise: as Kertzer (2017a) In treating reputation as unidimensional, existing scholarship on reputation has neglected to explore how actors weigh competing reputational considerations. To be clear, we are not faulting IR scholars for focusing on the particular types of reputation that interest them: as Lake and Powell (1999) Fearon and Wendt (2002) call a "tacit ontology", where simplifying assumptions made for purely analytic reasons end up shaping the questions we askand thus, the answers we get -about the constructs we study.…”

Section: Right 28mentioning

confidence: 99%

A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs

Brutger¹,

Kertzer²

2018

Int Org

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Politicians frequently turn to reputational arguments to bolster support for their proposed foreign policies. Yet despite the prevailing belief that domestic audiences care about reputation, there is very little direct evidence that publics care about reputation costs, and very little understanding of how. We propose a dispositional theory of reputation costs in which citizens facing ill-defined strategic situations turn to their core predispositions about foreign affairs in order to weigh competing reputational dimensions. Employing a diverse array of methodological tools—from vignette-based survey experiments to automated text analysis—we show that the mass public has a “taste” for reputation, but understands it in fundamentally different ways, with hawks concerned about the negative reputational consequences of inconsistency, and doves equally concerned with the negative reputational consequences of belligerence and interventionism. In illustrating how reputation costs are in our heads, our findings offer both good and bad news for theories of reputation in IR.

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“…Third, in light of the recent debates in social theory focusing on microfoundations (see, e.g. Kertzer, 2017), it is important to rethink the question of order from the perspective of agency, without which the impact of structural forces cannot be understood (Wendt, 1987). In this way, we can see how the creation and deterioration of order is related to diplomatic practice, interpretation and (mis)perception, rather than resulting simply from structural forces or rational choices based on national interests, however they are defined.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

Forsberg

2018

European Politics and Society

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Russia's role in the international order is often explained with reference to historical examples, analogies and longue durée trends. This article examines Russia's role in, and visions of, the international order from the Congress of Vienna to the end of the Cold War. The article also discusses the lessons, and perhaps also the wrong lessons, that the current Russian leadership and elite have drawn on the basis of past grand bargains. It concludes that in the course of history, there has been more variation than continuity in Russia's policy towards the European security system and, moreover, that the post-Cold War security order in Europe was not imposed on Russia during the years immediately following the end of the Cold War.

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Microfoundations in international relations

Cited by 76 publications

References 137 publications

A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

A Bottom‐Up Theory of Public Opinion about Foreign Policy

A Dispositional Theory of Reputation Costs

Russia and the European security order revisited: from the congress of Vienna to the post-cold war

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