Can participation in financial markets lead individuals to reevaluate the costs of conflict, change their political attitudes, and even their votes? Prior to the 2015 Israeli elections, we randomly assigned Palestinian and Israeli financial assets to likely voters and incentivized them to actively trade for up to 7 weeks. No political messages or nonfinancial information were included. The treatment systematically shifted vote choices toward parties more supportive of the peace process. This effect is not due to a direct material incentive to vote a particular way. Rather, the treatment reduces opposition to concessions for peace and changes awareness of the broader economic risks of conflict. While participants who were assigned Palestinian assets are more likely to associate their assets' performance with peace, they are less engaged in the experiment. Combined with the superior performance of Israeli stocks during the study period, the ultimate effects of Israeli and Palestinian assets are similar. the right-by about 4-5 percentage points (pp) relative to their vote share of 36% in the control. In particular, it reduces support for the incumbent Likud party, headed by Benjamin Netanyahu, by 4-5pp (relative to 20% in the control). At the same time, it increases the probability of voting for parties that support restarting the peace processthe left-by 4-6pp (relative to 25% in the control). This mainly reflects a 3-5pp increase in the probability of voting for the chief opposition group, The Zionist Union, which includes the Labour party. Consistent with random assignment, these estimates are unaffected by controlling for individuals' vote choices in the recently held 2013 elections as well as education, income levels, region, religiosity, risk and time preferences, initial financial literacy, and other characteristics. In terms of magnitude, the effects are comparable to estimated effects of changes in security risks (e.g., living within the range of rockets from Gaza) on Israeli voters (Getmansky and Zeitzoff (2014)).Section 6 examines the underlying mechanisms. The analysis here is more exploratory in nature, as we move away from a one-treatment-one-outcome framework to multiple (potentially underpowered) subtreatments and multiple outcomes, some of which are self-reported attitudes rather than chosen behavior. Nonetheless, we believe the results 1 The Rand Corporation estimates that a two-state solution, which it regards as the most likely to succeed, will yield Israelis an economic dividend of $123 billion over 10 years and Palestinians $50 billion (Anthony, Egel, Ries et al. (2015)). In contrast, a return to widespread conflict would lower Israeli gross domestic product (GDP) by $250 billion and Palestinian by $46 billion over the same period. See also Eckstein and Tsiddon (2004). 2 Since the entire country is a single constituency, our study had no effect on the election outcomes themselves.