Mind-body meets metaethics: a moral concept strategy

Yetter-Chappell, Helen; Chappell, Richard Yetter

doi:10.1007/s11098-012-9984-6

Cited by 11 publications

(7 citation statements)

References 15 publications

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“…The Kantian doctrine of transcendental idealism is also consistent with contemporary discourse in the philosophy of mind and epistemology, endeavouring mainly to answer questions concerning the mind-world relationship (int. al., [18][19][20][21][22][23]). One main question arising in this context concerns the relationship between the attributes of consciousness and the empirical experience of the phenomenological world [24] (p. 105).…”

Section: Consciousness: Essential Attributesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness in Pain: A New Model for Analysing Its Transformation

Naor-Hofri

2024

Philosophies

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When looking for an account that explains how pain changes consciousness, one finds that most studies in the phenomenology of pain focus either on the outcome of the change, or on how it affects the self, as a conscious object, and the self’s experiences in the world of objects. This paper focuses on the mechanism of consciousness, exploring the nature of the change that pain creates in consciousness and how exactly that change occurs. The paper provides a systematic, phenomenological inquiry in three phases: one identifies three essential attributes of consciousness, another identifies three essential attributes of pain, and a third analyses the outcome of the integration between both sets of attributes. The paper demonstrates how the change wrought by pain on the self, as a conscious object, allows the self to breach its boundaries as an object, and experience being a non-object, even if only in part and temporarily.

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Section: Consciousness: Essential Attributesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Consciousness in Pain: A New Model for Analysing Its Transformation

Naor-Hofri

2024

Philosophies

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“…Copp (2018), for instance, holds that we should take another community's term "wrong" to mean the same as our "wrong" if they are motivated to act in the same way as us in relation to using that word, even if they otherwise apply "wrong" in very different ways from us. See alsoYetter-Chappell and Yetter-Chappell (2013), who suggest that naturalists can adopt a view on which moral concepts are individuated by their action-guiding role and phenomenal character, and therefore the same moral concepts can be used by people who otherwise vastly differ in their dispositions to apply those concepts to things in the world.…”

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confidence: 99%

Quasi-Naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts

Golub

2021

J. Moral Philos.

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The following scenario seems possible: a community uses concepts that play the same role in guiding actions and shaping social life as our normative concepts, and yet refer to something else. As Eklund (2017) argues, this apparent possibility poses a problem for any normative realist who aspires to vindicate the thought that reality itself favors our ways of valuing and acting. How can realists make good on this idea, given that anything they might say in support of the privileged status of our normative concepts can be mirrored by the imagined community? E.g., the realist might claim that using our concepts is what we ought to do if we are to describe normative facts correctly, but members of the other community can claim the same about their concepts, using their own concept of ought. A promising approach to this challenge is to try to rule out the possibility of alternative normative concepts, by arguing that any concepts that have the same normative role must share a reference as well. (Eklund calls this referential normativity.) In this paper I argue that normative quasi-naturalism, a view that combines expressivism about normative discourse with a naturalist metaphysics of normativity, supports referential normativity and solves the problem of alternative normative concepts.

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“… 3 Another evaluative Mary case—offered in Yetter-Chappell and Yetter Chappell (2013)—is used to argue for an unbridgeable gap between moral and natural concepts. This case, however, does not explore the role of emotion, and thus is not relevant to the present work.…”

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confidence: 99%

The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience

Ballard

2020

Emotion Review

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Some philosophers claim that emotions are, at best, hindrances to the discovery of evaluative truths, while others omit them entirely from their epistemology of value. I argue, however, that this is a mistake. Drawing an evaluative parallel with Frank Jackson’s Mary case, I show there is a distinctive way in which emotions epistemically enhance evaluative judgment. This is, in fact, a conclusion philosophers of emotion have been eager to endorse. However, after considering several influential proposals—such as the view that emotions generate evaluative concepts, or the view that emotions justify evaluative beliefs on the model of perception—I conclude that the most promising contender is the notion that emotional experience acquaints us with evaluative properties.

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Mind-body meets metaethics: a moral concept strategy

Cited by 11 publications

References 15 publications

Consciousness in Pain: A New Model for Analysing Its Transformation

Consciousness in Pain: A New Model for Analysing Its Transformation

Quasi-Naturalism and the Problem of Alternative Normative Concepts

The Epistemic Significance of Emotional Experience

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