1991
DOI: 10.1086/229649
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Mind, Self, Society, and Computer: Artificial Intelligence and the Sociology of Mind

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Cited by 46 publications
(25 citation statements)
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“…This assumption does not equate interaction with humans and computers, but assumes that the interaction with a computer as the proximal actor is actually perceived as interaction with a computer. Although computers often do make choices based on complex algorithms (Kurzweil, 2000; Russell and Norvig, 2002; Shank, 2010b; Wolfe, 1991), this is not required for people to believe that computers engage in a strategy that betters their outcome. Although computers are not actually motivated or satiated, I assume the social exchange assumptions hold true for human actors interacting with computers that emulate humans via exchange strategies.…”
Section: Social Exchange Theory and Justicementioning
confidence: 99%
See 1 more Smart Citation
“…This assumption does not equate interaction with humans and computers, but assumes that the interaction with a computer as the proximal actor is actually perceived as interaction with a computer. Although computers often do make choices based on complex algorithms (Kurzweil, 2000; Russell and Norvig, 2002; Shank, 2010b; Wolfe, 1991), this is not required for people to believe that computers engage in a strategy that betters their outcome. Although computers are not actually motivated or satiated, I assume the social exchange assumptions hold true for human actors interacting with computers that emulate humans via exchange strategies.…”
Section: Social Exchange Theory and Justicementioning
confidence: 99%
“…Although computers—and technologies more generally—affect social aspects of justice in many ways, I orient my research around the assumption that people can and do perceive computers as actors in social life. Many related research programs contend that computers are social actors because people exhibit social responses to them (Brave and Nass, 2008; Nass and Moon, 2000; Reeves and Nass, 1996), that technologies are not only tools but causal actors in social life and networks (Latour, 1996, 2005; Law and Hassard, 1999), and that interaction with nonhumans is of growing importance in sociology (Cerulo, 2009; Latour, 1988; Wolfe, 1991). I do not make the strong and highly debated claim that computers are in fact social in the same way humans are, but instead assume that people act toward computers as if they were social actors when the computers fill social positions or exhibit social cues (Ferdig and Mishra, 2004; Nass and Moon, 2000; Reeves and Nass, 1996).…”
Section: Introductionmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…In the past three years, over six workshops in this area have been held in conjunction with the AAAI meetings and the ORSA/TIMS. The growing general interest in sociology with computational approaches (Bainbridge, 1987;Bainbridge, et al 1994;Brent, forthcoming;Wolfe, 1991) is reflected in this growing interest in computational organization theory. Finally, within the organization area there appears to be not only growing interest, but an increase in the extent to which later work builds on earlier work and an increase in the sophistication of the models.…”
Section: Resultsmentioning
confidence: 99%
“…To date, there has been a lack of sociological interest in human-humanoid relationships and very few have examined the social impact of human-humanoid interaction [64,65,70,73,77]. In my view what is required is a set of conceptual tools that are capable of engaging with the boundary contradictions that robot-human relations evoke.…”
Section: Conclusion: New Conceptual Tools-ontology Stories and Languagementioning
confidence: 99%