Mind-Wandering and Self-Referential Thought

D’Argembeau, Arnaud

doi:10.1093/oxfordhb/9780190464745.013.14

Cited by 20 publications

(18 citation statements)

References 107 publications

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“…Interestingly, psychedelic drugs have been shown to decrease activity in the mPFC and PCC as well (Carhart-Harris et al, 2012 ; Palhano-Fontes et al, 2015 ). These nodes of the DMN have been shown to be more active during various types of self-related stimuli (Northoff et al, 2006 ; Sugiura et al, 2008 ; Qin and Northoff, 2011 ; Tacikowski et al, 2017 ), self-reflection (Jenkins and Mitchell, 2011 ; D'Argembeau, 2018 ) and autobiographical memory retrieval (Cabeza and St Jacques, 2007 ). A recent study using dynamic causal modeling suggested that self-referential processes are driven by PCC activity and modulated by the regulatory influences of the mPFC (Davey et al, 2016 ).…”

Section: Alterations Of Self-consciousness Induced By Meditation and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness

et al. 2018

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In recent years, the scientific study of meditation and psychedelic drugs has seen remarkable developments. The increased focus on meditation in cognitive neuroscience has led to a cross-cultural classification of standard meditation styles validated by functional and structural neuroanatomical data. Meanwhile, the renaissance of psychedelic research has shed light on the neurophysiology of altered states of consciousness induced by classical psychedelics, such as psilocybin and LSD, whose effects are mainly mediated by agonism of serotonin receptors. Few attempts have been made at bridging these two domains of inquiry, despite intriguing evidence of overlap between the phenomenology and neurophysiology of meditation practice and psychedelic states. In particular, many contemplative traditions explicitly aim at dissolving the sense of self by eliciting altered states of consciousness through meditation, while classical psychedelics are known to produce significant disruptions of self-consciousness, a phenomenon known as drug-induced ego dissolution. In this article, we discuss available evidence regarding convergences and differences between phenomenological and neurophysiological data on meditation practice and psychedelic drug-induced states, with a particular emphasis on alterations of self-experience. While both meditation and psychedelics may disrupt self-consciousness and underlying neural processes, we emphasize that neither meditation nor psychedelic states can be conceived as simple, uniform categories. Moreover, we suggest that there are important phenomenological differences even between conscious states described as experiences of self-loss. As a result, we propose that self-consciousness may be best construed as a multidimensional construct, and that “self-loss,” far from being an unequivocal phenomenon, can take several forms. Indeed, various aspects of self-consciousness, including narrative aspects linked to autobiographical memory, self-related thoughts and mental time travel, and embodied aspects rooted in multisensory processes, may be differently affected by psychedelics and meditation practices. Finally, we consider long-term outcomes of experiences of self-loss induced by meditation and psychedelics on individual traits and prosocial behavior. We call for caution regarding the problematic conflation of temporary states of self-loss with “selflessness” as a behavioral or social trait, although there is preliminary evidence that correlations between short-term experiences of self-loss and long-term trait alterations may exist.

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Section: Alterations Of Self-consciousness Induced By Meditation and mentioning

confidence: 99%

Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness

et al. 2018

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“…Self-as-object thus greatly resembles Duval and Wicklund’s (1972) concept of “objective self-awareness,” when attention is directed inward and one’s attention is focused on oneself in which case one becomes the target of ones’ own attention. Brain regions typically activated during self-as-object experiences include the medial prefrontal cortex, posterior cingulate/precuneus, inferior parietal lobules, and areas of the medial and lateral temporal lobes (D’Argembeau, 2018). These brain areas are also recruited during rest (i.e., default mode network) typically implicated in self-directed cognition (Buckner et al, 2008).…”

Section: Two Types For Self-experiencesmentioning

confidence: 99%

Self-reported inner speech illuminates the frequency and content of self-as-subject and self-as-object experiences.

Morin¹

2022

Psychology of Consciousness: Theory, Research, and Practice

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Although several attempts have been made to explain the nature of self-as-subject and self-as-object experiences, the examination of specific manifestations of these experiences in everyday life remains understudied. In this brief article, I used preexisting data pertaining to self-reported inner speech as a window into what self-as-subject and self-as-object experiences look like in terms of their typical content and frequency. Selfas-subject refers to the self immersed in current perception of the world accompanied by minimal self-awareness, whereas self-as-object designates a state of self taking itself as the object of its own attention (James, 1890). One observation is that self-reported inner speech instances of self-as-subject experiences were much more frequent than self-asobject experiences, possibly because it is more advantageous to be immersed in experience while engaged in activities as opposed to self-reflecting about these activities; another possibility is that our participants were more immersed in their experience (self-as-subject) when answering the prompts "I talk to myself about, because, and when," which may not encourage reporting self-as-object experiences. A second observation is that self-experiences as subject and object consisted in several everyday activities and self-reflective practices typical of university students, such as one's emotions, current self, studying, leisure, remembering, problem solving, and planning. I conclude that recoding self-reported inner speech instances with reference to self-as-subject and self-as-object experiences represents a fruitful research avenue but note that such data should be gathered in nonstudent populations.

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“…Second, from a phenomenological perspective, dreams are at core immersive, involving a simulated world centered on a simulated self (Windt, 2015; Windt et al, 2016). Similarly, daydreams tend to be focused on self-related concerns (D’Argembeau, 2018) and often contain vivid audio-visual imagery as well as emotions (Foulkes and Fleisher, 1975). Yet, daydreams lack the “here and now” quality of sleep dreams: in wakefulness, we don’t lose touch with our actual environments or feel present in imagined ones as completely as we do in sleep-dreams.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Does the Mind Wander When the Brain Takes a Break? Local Sleep in Wakefulness, Attentional Lapses and Mind-Wandering

et al. 2019

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Sleep has been classically described as an all-or-nothing global phenomenon. However, recent research strongly suggests that this view requires tempering. Invasive and non-invasive recordings in animals and humans show that neural activity typically associated with sleep can locally occur during wakefulness. Although local sleep is defined neuronally, it has been associated with impaired performance during cognitive tasks. Comparatively, the phenomenology of local sleep (i.e., what it feels like when your brain is partially asleep) has been less explored. Taking into account the literature on the neuronal and behavioral profile of local sleep intrusions in wakefulness, we propose that occurrences of local sleep could represent the neural mechanism underlying many attentional lapses. In particular, we argue that a unique physiological event such as local sleep could account for a diversity of behavioral outcomes from sluggish to impulsive responses. We further propose that local sleep intrusions could impact individuals’ subjective experience. Specifically, we propose that the timing and anatomical sources of local sleep intrusions could be responsible for both the behavioral consequences and subjective content of attentional lapses and may underlie the difference between subjective experiences such as mind wandering and mind blanking. Our framework aims to build a parallel between spontaneous experiences in sleep and wakefulness by integrating evidence across neuronal, behavioral and experiential levels. We use the example of attention deficit hyperactivity disorder (ADHD) to illustrate how local sleep could explain complex cognitive profiles which include inattention, impulsivity, mind-wandering and mind-blanking.

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Mind-Wandering and Self-Referential Thought

Cited by 20 publications

References 107 publications

Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness

Psychedelics, Meditation, and Self-Consciousness

Self-reported inner speech illuminates the frequency and content of self-as-subject and self-as-object experiences.

Does the Mind Wander When the Brain Takes a Break? Local Sleep in Wakefulness, Attentional Lapses and Mind-Wandering

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