Mindshaping

Abstract

According to consensus, distinctively human social accomplishments rely on an individual, neurally implemented capacity to represent the mental states of others, typically called “mindreading” or “theory of mind.” On this view, early humans and their immediate precursors moved beyond typical primate social arrangements, e.g., by engaging in large-scale cooperative projects with individuals of whom they have scant personal knowledge, in virtue of developing a theory of mind. This chapter articulates, explores, and defends an alternative. On this view, mindreading is not the lynchpin of distinctively human sociality; rather, what sets us apart is “mindshaping”—our capacity to shape each other to be easily interpretable. Such mindshaping includes high-fidelity imitation, prolific pedagogy, norm enforcement, and narrative self-constitution. Compared to other primates we excel at these; according to the mindshaping hypothesis, this explains our distinctive social capacities. The affinities between the mindshaping hypothesis and 4E approaches to cognition are also discussed.

Failures of Methodological Individualism: The Materiality of Social Systems

“…Chs. 2-3;Zawidzki 2013). Other non-human animals, e.g., crows, also have a capacity to develop rudimentary "culture" in the sense that they develop skills and tools that are passed from one generation to the next by learning rather than by becoming innate.…”

“…They, in turn, may just follow the direction she took when she set off, thus learning the route without direct instruction. This can be regarded as a kind of apprenticeship that is common to social learning: take a cue from the more knowledgeable around you, figure it out as best you can how to accomplish the task based on their lead, and await correction (from the circumstances or from those more knowledgeable), when you go wrong (Sterelny 2013; on social reproduction, see also Zawidzki 2013;McGeer 2007).…”

Phenomenological Skepticism Reconsidered: A Husserlian Answer to Dennett’s Challenge

“…Zawidzki has suggested that Dennett’s strategy is to deflate and revise our manifest concepts of intentionality and consciousness in terms of publicly observable patterns of behavior. As intersubjectively verifiable phenomena, describable from the intentional stance and captured by heterophenomenology, they are, then, arguably easier to reconcile with the scientific image, i.e., what standard science accepts and rules out ( Zawidzki, 2007 , p. 154–156; cf. Dennett, 1987 , p. 25).…”

“…Dennett denies the existence of qualia so defined as objectively undetectable, intersubjectively untestable, and, thus, incompatible with standard science. Hence, Dennett regards investigating consciousness scientifically in these terms impossible (see Zawidzki, 2007 , p. 167–169). Whether Dennett’s self-avowed eliminative materialism and verificationism about qualia amounts to denying conscious experience conceived in less contentious terms is debatable 20 .…”

“… 26 One could argue that in the last three decades Dennett has indeed reflected on the place and function of human consciousness and intentionality in the natural world by presenting a (naturalistic) theory of their emergence and gradual evolution by natural selection. In his efforts to integrate them into the scientific worldview, Dennett has openly committed himself to Darwinian adaptationism, granting neither phenomenal consciousness nor intrinsic intentionality a role in the evolution of human cognition (see Zawidzki, 2007 , p. 81–85, 122, 126–129; Thompson, 2009 , p. 4, 6, 70, 74). Still, this leaves the status of the natural-scientific worldview, its reality and objectivity, unclarified and offers little justification for adopting it.…”