Ministers as double agents? The delegation process between cabinet and ministers

Abstract

Delegation from cabinet to ministers is complicated because the cabinet consists of the same ministers that are supposed to act as its agents. In the extreme case ministers are completely autonomous within their portfolio. This paper argues that the resulting potential for agency loss is limited, but not negated, by both hierarchy and collective decision-making in cabinet, or by establishing direct delegation relationships between legislative committees or political parties and ministers, bypassing the government. Appointments to ministerial office are the prevailing exception to ministerial autonomy. To the extent that ministerial preferences are not stable and exogenous, screening before appointments is an ineffective control, and ministerial identification with departmental interests is the most probable source of agency loss.

Coalition agreement and party mandate: How coalition agreements constrain the ministers

“…Finally, Andeweg (2000) points out that ministers might go 'native' and defend their departmental interests rather than those of their party.…”

“…This argument -according to which cabinet decision-making is determined by a document written by the coalition parties -does not necessarily mean that ministers are constrained by a text imposed 'from above' that they had no chance of influencing. Andeweg (2000) has argued that when ministers have drafted the coalition agreement they might promote the government's obligations rather than those of the party, but this statement has to be tested. We still do not know to what extent ministers who negotiate are aware of their future participation in government or the portfolios they will get.…”

Shadowing Ministers

“…Many scholars conceive of parliamentary government as a chain of delegation relationships, with voters delegating to MPs, MPs delegating to the cabinet as a whole, the cabinet delegating to ministers, and ministers delegating to senior bureaucrats (e.g., Andeweg, 2000;Müller, 2000;Strøm, 2000). At each point in the chain, the question arises as to what the principals can do to ensure that their agents perform in their (the principals') interests.…”

“…Andeweg, 2000). Yet the story does not end here because the collective leadership, whatever form it takes, will not wish to review all ministerial proposals and actions themselves.…”

Manifest and Latent Control on the Council by the European Council

“…To qualify as a principal, an actor "must be able to both grant authority and rescind it" (Hawkins et al 2006: 7), giving the principal "hard control" over the agent (Abbott et al 2016: 719). Although the formal powers of the HoSG vis-à-vis their ministers vary across the member states (Andeweg 2000;Dunleavy and Rhodes 1990;Helms 2005), the HoSG can usually remove the ministers from office. Since the members of the EUCO possess hard control over the members of the Council of the EU, ministers deviating from the decisions of the EUCO risk losing their domestic office.…”