Shadowing Ministers

Abstract

In this article the authors study delegation problems within multiparty coalition governments. They argue that coalition parties can use the committee system to "shadow" the ministers of their partners; that is, they can appoint committee chairs from other governing parties, who will then be well placed to monitor and/or check the actions of the corresponding ministers. The authors analyze which ministers should be shadowed if governing parties seek to minimize the aggregate policy losses they suffer as the result of ministers pursuing their own parties' interests rather than the coalition's. Based on data from 19 mostly European parliamentary democracies, the authors find that the greater the policy disagreement between a minister's party and its partners, the more likely the minister is to be shadowed. Keywords coalitions, delegation, legislatures, parliamentary committeesA growing literature addresses delegation problems within multiparty coalition governments, especially the problem of controlling cabinet ministers

Government dominance and the role of opposition in parliamentary democracies

“…Our findings also speak to the literature on coalition governance. Although committee chairmanship is considered an important institutional prerogative among various devices coalition partners may use to overcome their principal-agent problems (Carroll & Cox, 2012;Hallerberg, 2000;Martin & Vanberg, 2011), as our results suggest the costs of using these devices can become more pronounced for the partner when the opposition is likely to support her decision to challenge government bills.…”

“…In particular, committee chairs have privileges -be they formal or informal -to determine the agenda of the committee and to affect the overall committee deliberations. As a result, it has been argued that chairing committees can help coalition partners to monitor and scrutinize government bills when ministerial drift is more likely due to diverging policy preferences between coalition parties (Carroll & Cox, 2012;Kim & Loewenberg, 2005;Krauss et al, 2021). 7 Indeed, controlling access to committee chairmanship may provide political parties with greater influence over the policy-making process (Dach, 1989).…”

What makes a good minister of a political party? Impact of party- and field-related experience on party pledge fulfilment

“…The competing vision points to the existence and activity of multiple principals, especially other coalition parties which possess the tools to enforce the fulfilment of their own pledges. Coalition agreements specify the activity of ministers in policy making (Moury, 2011); parliamentary committees help to check the formulation of government proposals (André et al, 2016; Kim and Loewenberg, 2005), employing ‘watchdog’ junior ministers (Carroll and Cox, 2012; Thies, 2001), or parliamentary questions can be used as a control mechanism of coalition partners (Höhmann and Sieberer, 2020). Multiple agency relate not only to coalition parties but also to other possible principals.…”

Policy‐Seeking and Office‐Seeking: Categorizing Parties Based on Coalition Payoff Allocation

“…Deputy ministers have access to ministries experts, can influence policy formation, prevent abuses by ministers from other parties and keep policies in "previously agreed in Pareto optimal, and carefully negotiated" coalition positions (Giannetti and Laver 2005, 97). Similarly, committee chairs are able to influence policies by increasing public awareness of issues through hearings, choosing who will testify, and by advancing or delaying proposed legislation (Carroll and Cox 2012;Kim and Loewenberg 2005;Strøm, M€ uller, and Smith 2010). The inclusion of deputy ministers, and committee chairs, together with ministers, helps further discern the policy-seeking and office-seeking values of coalition payoffs.…”