‘Mirror, mirror on the wall, please tell me … ’: the populist rhetoric of the ‘new’ media of ‘new Turkey’ during the April 16, 2017 referendum

Erçetin, Tuğçe; Erdoğan, Emre

doi:10.1080/14683849.2021.1874824

Cited by 4 publications

(1 citation statement)

References 45 publications

Supporting

Mentioning

Contrasting

Order By: Relevance

“…Indeed, a brief look at the content of the AKP campaign brochure reveals that the promoted benefits of centralized decision making under a strong executive are repeatedly emphasized, and there is very little concern about maintaining the separation of powers 12 . More systematic analyses of the 2017 referendum campaign further identify populism as a major factor that helped AKP to justify its bid to concentrate powers in the hands of the executive (Erçetin & Erdoğan, 2021). 13 Meanwhile, the opposition parties framed AKP's campaign as a move towards authoritarian rule by highlighting the lack of accountability and transparency under the proposed changes.…”

Section: Background and The Empirical Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%

When do workers support executive aggrandizement? Lessons from the recent Turkish experience

Apaydin

Öngel

Schmid

et al. 2022

Industrial Relations Journal

View full text Add to dashboard Cite

Following the 2017 constitutional referendum under the Adalet ve Kalkinma Partisi (Justice and Development Party‐AKP) rule in Turkey, the reforms granted judicial and legislative powers to the head of the executive under a presidential system. Initial observations reveal that some blue‐collar workers who are members of a historically progressive union have also supported these reforms. This is surprising because the union leadership has publicly opposed these changes. What explains this discrepancy? Why did some of these workers support reforms in favour of a powerful executive? Based on a sample from a major metalworking union, this paper finds that partisan identity moderates support for AKP's push for challenging the separation of powers. Although we find that higher amount of debt may reduce worker support for stronger executive, this is conditional on the metal workers' pre‐existing partisan commitments. Under these circumstances, highly indebted partisan workers do not diverge from the party line. These results also raise further questions for students of labour and regime change elsewhere in the developing world.

show abstract

Section: Background and The Empirical Puzzlementioning

confidence: 99%