Mismatch? Comparing elite and citizen polarisation on EU issues across four countries

Abstract

National politicisation of European Union issues has risen following events such as the economic crisis and the refugee influx. This has led to changes at the party (rising Eurosceptic parties) and the voter level (increasing public Euroscepticism). EU politicisation is thus assumed to influence the overall distribution of EU positions in terms of EU polarisation. This raises the question to what extent there is a (mis)match between polarisation at the party and voter level, and its dependence on structural and supply-side dynamics. Using CHES 2017 data and survey data across four EU countries (Germany, Spain, Hungary and the Netherlands) this paper compares eliteand citizen-level EU polarisation. The results show a strong association of party-and citizen-level EU polarisationfor both general and policy-specific EU positionswith higher polarisation among citizens than among parties. Country-specific patterns are due to different political competition on the supply side.

Emergency politics, mass sentiment and the EU during Covid

“…However, this expectation needs to be set against the heated debates on the EU’s involvement in past crises that heavily polarised public opinion on its role in crisis management (Goldberg et al 2020 ; Di Mauro and Memoli 2021 ). While the EU’s involvement in crafting joint solutions to address the consequences of the pandemic may be generally welcomed, it may also reinforce the views of a dissenting minority that perceives this involvement as yet another assault on national sovereignty.…”

Caught between sovereignty and solidarity? A multidimensional revisitation of EU mass–elite congruence

“…First, while research on elite and mass opinion towards the EU is moving past the hitherto dominant one-dimensional approach (Sanders and Toka, 2013; see Hobolt and De Vries, 2016), most studies of EU mass–elite congruence have not yet adopted a multidimensional perspective embracing both general European integration and its sub-dimensions 5 . This is unfortunate because, given the protean nature of the European dimension, ‘[w]hich specific issue items are more salient and relevant might depend on a member state's level of EU integration issues faced at the time of measurement’ (Shim and Gherghina, 2020: 513; see Goldberg et al ., 2020). In other words, multidimensional examinations could shed light on the idiosyncratic strains between masses and elites taking place in different member states at any given moment, paving the way for reflections on context-specific political dynamics.…”

“…Holmberg, 1997), the 5 Even recent 'multidimensional' approaches to party-voter incongruence and vote switching did not consider subdimensions alongside the general European dimension (Bakker et al, 2018(Bakker et al, , 2020. A further work on citizens' and parties' stances towards European integration did, yet it centred on their respective polarization, rather than congruence stricto sensu (Goldberg et al, 2020).…”

Studying (De-)Politicization of the EU from a Citizens Point of View: A New Comparative Focus Group Study

“…Yet, while the politicization of the EU by political parties and media is now well documented (Statham and Trenz, 2013;Hurrelmann et al, 2013;Costa Lobo and Karremans, 2018;Braun et al, 2016;Grande and Hutter, 2016;Hurrelmann et al, 2020;De Bruycker, 2017), the picture is muddier when it comes to citizens. While some studies report the increased impact of European issues on individual vote choice (Belot and Van Ingelgom, 2015;Beaudonnet and Gomez, 2017;Goldberg et al, 2020), others demonstrate citizens' indifference to and ambivalence over European integration (Duchesne et al, 2013;Van Ingelgom, 2014;Baglioni and Hurrelmann, 2016;Palonen et al, 2019;Le Corre Juratic et al, 2020). How, then, do European citizens see and talk about Europe?…”