Mix me a list: Context moderates the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect

Dechêne, Alice; Stahl, Christoph; Hansen, Jochim; Wänke, Michaela

doi:10.1016/j.jesp.2009.06.019

Cited by 79 publications

(88 citation statements)

References 27 publications

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“…For example, participants may well differentiate whether experienced fluency stems from the retrieved object itself, or rather from some external source, the so-called context (previous encounters, perceptual conditions, etc. ; see Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2009Hansen & Wänke, 2013;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). Several studies have shown that such subjective evaluations of the experienced retrieval fluency could have substantial impact (see von Helversen, Gendolla, Winkielman, & Schmidt, 2008;Wänke & Hansen, 2015).…”

Section: Small Impact Of Experimental Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

“…One would have to assume that participants are aware that subjectively experienced increases in retrieval fluency during an experimental session are merely due to repeated presentations of that object, and are thus not diagnostic of one's true familiarity with that object (cf. Dechêne et al, 2009Dechêne et al, , 2010Hansen & Wänke, 2013;Undorf & Erdfelder, 2015). Studying the effect of experimentally manipulated fluency on FH use, Hertwig et al (2008, Exp.…”

Section: Small Impact Of Experimental Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

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The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

et al. 2016

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In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers could use the subjectively experienced difference in retrieval fluency of the objects as a cue. According to the fluency heuristic (FH) theory, decision makers use fluency-as indexed by recognition speed-as the only cue for pairs of recognized objects, and infer that the object retrieved more speedily has the larger criterion value (ignoring all other cues and information). Model-based analyses, however, have previously revealed that only a small portion of such inferences are indeed based on fluency alone. In the majority of cases, other information enters the decision process. However, due to the specific experimental procedures, the estimates of FH use are potentially biased: Some procedures may have led to an overestimated and others to an underestimated, or even to actually reduced, FH use. In the present article, we discuss and test the impacts of such procedural variations by reanalyzing 21 data sets. The results show noteworthy consistency across the procedural variations revealing low FH use. We discuss potential explanations and implications of this finding.

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Section: Small Impact Of Experimental Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

Section: Small Impact Of Experimental Proceduresmentioning

confidence: 99%

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

et al. 2016

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“…As razões que são dadas aos participantes para justificar esta apresentação prévia das afirmações variam na literatura: em alguns estudos não é apresentada nenhuma justificação específica e pede-se apenas aos participantes que leiam um conjunto de afirmações (e.g., Unkelbach, 2007, exp. 3); outros pedem avaliações do grau de interesse das frases (e.g., Begg, Anas, & Farinacci, 1992, exp. 2); ou julgamentos de compreensibili dade (e.g., Hawkins, Hoch, & Meyers-Levy, 2001); havendo ainda estudos que pedem julgamentos de verdade logo no primeiro encontro com os estímulos (e.g., Dechêne, Stahl, Hansen, & Wänke, 2009). …”

Section: Procedimentounclassified

“…Neste contexto, o efeito de verdade é analisado numa comparação entre as avaliações dos estímulos repetidos e as avaliações dos estímulos novos, isto é, uma comparação entre-ítens (Dechêne et al, 2010). Diferentemente, num contexto homogéneo os participantes fazem os julgamentos de verdade relativamente a um mesmo conjunto de estímulos apresentados na fase de exposição e repetidos nas fases subsequentes (e.g., Dechêne et al, 2009;Schwartz, 1982). Aqui, o efeito de verdade é analisado nas comparações das avaliações feitas na primeira exposição com as avaliações feitas nos momentos posteriores, isto é, uma comparação intra-ítens (Dechêne et al, 2010).…”

Section: Contextos De Apresentação Dos Estímulosunclassified

Paradigma associado ao estudo da ilusão de verdade

Silva¹,

Figueira²,

Garcia‐Marques³

2013

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ResumoNeste artigo apresentamos o paradigma subjacente ao efeito de ilusão de verdade -o William James O efeito de ilusão de verdade ficou conhecido e definido como tal após um estudo de Hasher, Goldstein e Topino (1977), que demostrou que afirmações repetidas são consideradas mais verdadeiras do que afirmações apresentadas uma única vez (e isto independentemente das frases serem objectivamente verdadeiras ou falsas). Em 1979, Bacon (o heterónimo de um grupo de investigadores encabeçado por Ian Begg) publica um artigo que avança as primeiras explicações teóricas para o efeito, estabelecendo-o definitivamente na literatura.Laboratório de Psicologia, 10(2): 223-233 (2012Psicologia, 10(2): 223-233 ( ) © 2012 Paradigma associado ao estudo da ilusão de verdade Rita Silva Pedro Figueira Teresa Garcia-Marques ISPA -Instituto UniversitárioNota do autor: Este trabalho foi realizado como parte dos trabalhos do projecto PTDC/PSI-PCO/121916/2010 financiado pela FCT -Fundação para a Ciência e Tecnologia e dos trabalhos de dotoramento da primeira autora financiados pela mesma instituição (SFRH/BD/39153/2007). A correspondência relativa a este artigo deverá ser enviada para: Teresa Garcia-Marques,

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“…Subconsciously, individuals tend to minimize their cognitive load when making complex decisions that involve extensive learning processes [15]. Exposure to a previously unknown object makes this object more likable when prior knowledge reduces the load on cognitive processes that take place during the decision-making process [16]. In other words, familiarity reduces the complexity of mental processing, while the positive cognitive feeling of making an easier decision is misattributed to the object being rated.…”

Section: Introductionmentioning

confidence: 99%

Can Financial Education Extend the Border of Bounded Rationality?

Greenberg¹,

Shtudiner²

2016

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When choosing a particular alternative from a number of financial assets, risk is an important feature. According to the classic Capital Assets Pricing Model (CAPM), we would expect to receive a positive correlation between risk and return of financial assets. However, studies show that investors judge financial assets in terms of "good" or "bad". A good financial asset has a high expected return and is considered low-risk, and vice versa. This type of thinking is biased, as it is both irrational and contradicts the classical theory of finance. One explanation for this bias is the affect heuristic. According to this heuristic, the investor forms her attitude about the asset in the first stage, and then links all of her subsequent judgments to this attitude. The aim of this study is to examine how this bias is affected by studying the CAPM in Finance entry courses. An experiment was conducted in which each subject made both risk judgments and return judgments in regard to 25 domestic stocks chosen randomly from the Tel Aviv 100 stock index. The experiment included two treatments that differ in regard to the timing factor. Some of the subjects were asked to judge the return and risk ratings before learning about the CAPM in class; the others were asked after studying the CAPM material. Finance education reduced the bias, but did not prevent it. The results show that in the teaching of Economics, there should be a balance between providing a coherent theoretical framework together with behavioral aspects. Moreover, given that finance education did not prevent the bias among students with background in quantitative analysis, it is reasonable to assume that other agents without this background would have more difficulties to apply the principles of investments under uncertainty.

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Mix me a list: Context moderates the truth effect and the mere-exposure effect

Cited by 79 publications

References 27 publications

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

Paradigma associado ao estudo da ilusão de verdade

Can Financial Education Extend the Border of Bounded Rationality?

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