The limited use of the fluency heuristic: Converging evidence across different procedures

Abstract

In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers could use the subjectively experienced difference in retrieval fluency of the objects as a cue. According to the fluency heuristic (FH) theory, decision makers use fluency-as indexed by recognition speed-as the only cue for pairs of recognized objects, and infer that the object retrieved more speedily has the larger criterion value (ignoring all other cues and information). Model-based analyses, however, have previously revealed that only a small portion of such inferences are indeed based on fluency alone. In the majority of cases, other information enters the decision process. However, due to the specific experimental procedures, the estimates of FH use are potentially biased: Some procedures may have led to an overestimated and others to an underestimated, or even to actually reduced, FH use. In the present article, we discuss and test the impacts of such procedural variations by reanalyzing 21 data sets. The results show noteworthy consistency across the procedural variations revealing low FH use. We discuss potential explanations and implications of this finding.

Further evidence for the memory state heuristic: Recognition latency predictions for binary inferences

“…The fluency heuristic, in contrast, is silent about the predicted effect size for knowledge cases as compared with recognition cases. Notably, this MSH prediction has already found some support in previous research (e.g., Hilbig et al, 2011;Marewski & Schooler, 2011;Pohl et al, 2016;Schwikert & Curran, 2014).…”

“…In this paper, we primarily aim to test a crucial and counterintuitive prediction that has not been directly addressed before and conflicts with the popular notion that processing fluency -or cognitive fluency in general -boosts preference for a choice option (Schooler & Hertwig, 2005;Zajonc, 1968). In addition, we provide support for the MSH through conceptual replications of predictions previously tested by different researchers (Erdfelder et al, 2011;Hertwig, Herzog, Schooler, & Reimer, 2008;Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2011;Schooler & Hertwig, 2005;Pohl, Erdfelder, Michalkiewicz, Castela, & Hilbig, 2016). In this way, we aim at closing a gap in previous research on the MSH and provide converging evidence on the importance of memory strength (rather than recognition judgments) in recognition-based decision making.…”

Linking process and measurement models of recognition-based decisions.

“…The fluency heuristic states that the faster recognized item is chosen in trials involving two recognized objects (RR pairs; Hertwig et al, 2008; Schooler & Hertwig, 2005). Despite empirical evidence against such an account (Hilbig, Erdfelder, & Pohl, 2011; Pohl, Erdfelder, Michalkiewicz, Castela, & Hilbig, 2016), the recognition speed could still confound any analysis of choice RTs. Specifically, memory-based decisions in trials with further knowledge might not be faster because of the increased coherence of further information with recognition (as stated by PCS) but rather due to faster recognition itself (Gigerenzer & Goldstein, 2011).…”

Use of the familiarity difference cue in inferential judgments

“…2 Although a previous study showed that the use of the fluency heuristic was independent from the order of recognition and choice tasks (Pohl, Erdfelder, Michalkiewicz, Castela, & Hilbig, 2016), we used the first ratings only. This was to ensure that prior exposure to the items had no influence on choice (in line with exposure effects; e.g., Zajonc, 1968 For the fictitious-fictitious (FF) pairs, there is no criterion to judge which one is the larger city, but participants may falsely recognize a city and choose accordingly.…”