The recognition heuristic (RH) theory states that, in comparative judgments (e.g., Which of two cities has more inhabitants?), individuals infer that recognized objects score higher on the criterion (e.g., population) than unrecognized objects. Indeed, it has often been shown that recognized options are judged to outscore unrecognized ones (e.g., recognized cities are judged as larger than unrecognized ones), although different accounts of this general finding have been proposed. According to the RH theory, this pattern occurs because the binary recognition judgment determines the inference and no other information will reverse this. An alternative account posits that recognized objects are chosen because knowledge beyond mere recognition typically points to the recognized object. A third account can be derived from the memory-state heuristic framework. According to this framework, underlying memory states of objects (rather than recognition judgments) determine the extent of RH use: When two objects are compared, the one associated with a “higher” memory state is preferred, and reliance on recognition increases with the “distance” between their memory states. The three accounts make different predictions about the impact of subjective recognition experiences—whether an object is merely recognized or recognized with further knowledge—on RH use. We estimated RH use for different recognition experiences across 16 published data sets, using a multinomial processing tree model. Results supported the memory-state heuristic in showing that RH use increases when recognition is accompanied by further knowledge.Electronic supplementary materialThe online version of this article (doi:10.3758/s13423-014-0587-4) contains supplementary material, which is available to authorized users.

One of the most prominent models of probabilistic inferences from memory is the simple recognition heuristic (RH). The RH theory assumes that judgments are based on recognition in isolation, such that other information is ignored. However, some prior research has shown that available knowledge is not generally ignored. In line with the notion of adaptive strategy selection-and, thus, a trade-off between accuracy and effort-we hypothesized that information integration crucially depends on how easily accessible information beyond recognition is, how much confidence decision makers have in this information, and how (cognitively) costly it is to acquire it. In three experiments, we thus manipulated (a) the availability of information beyond recognition, (b) the subjective usefulness of this information, and (c) the cognitive costs associated with acquiring this information. In line with the predictions, we found that RH use decreased substantially, the more easily and confidently information beyond recognition could be integrated, and increased substantially with increasing cognitive costs.

The recognition heuristic (RH) theory predicts that, in comparative judgment tasks, if one object is recognized and the other is not, the recognized one is chosen. The memory-state heuristic (MSH) extends the RH by assuming that choices are not affected by recognition judgments per se, but by the memory states underlying these judgments (i.e., recognition certainty, uncertainty, or rejection certainty). Specifically, the larger the discrepancy between memory states, the larger the probability of choosing the object in the higher state. The typical RH paradigm does not allow estimation of the underlying memory states because it is unknown whether the objects were previously experienced or not. Therefore, we extended the paradigm by repeating the recognition task twice. In line with high threshold models of recognition, we assumed that inconsistent recognition judgments result from uncertainty whereas consistent judgments most likely result from memory certainty. In Experiment 1, we fitted 2 nested multinomial models to the data: an MSH model that formalizes the relation between memory states and binary choices explicitly and an approximate model that ignores the (unlikely) possibility of consistent guesses. Both models provided converging results. As predicted, reliance on recognition increased with the discrepancy in the underlying memory states. In Experiment 2, we replicated these results and found support for choice consistency predictions of the MSH. Additionally, recognition and choice latencies were in agreement with the MSH in both experiments. Finally, we validated critical parameters of our MSH model through a cross-validation method and a third experiment. (PsycINFO Database Record

In paired comparisons based on which of two objects has the larger criterion value, decision makers could use the subjectively experienced difference in retrieval fluency of the objects as a cue. According to the fluency heuristic (FH) theory, decision makers use fluency-as indexed by recognition speed-as the only cue for pairs of recognized objects, and infer that the object retrieved more speedily has the larger criterion value (ignoring all other cues and information). Model-based analyses, however, have previously revealed that only a small portion of such inferences are indeed based on fluency alone. In the majority of cases, other information enters the decision process. However, due to the specific experimental procedures, the estimates of FH use are potentially biased: Some procedures may have led to an overestimated and others to an underestimated, or even to actually reduced, FH use. In the present article, we discuss and test the impacts of such procedural variations by reanalyzing 21 data sets. The results show noteworthy consistency across the procedural variations revealing low FH use. We discuss potential explanations and implications of this finding.

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