Modeling bluffing behavior in signaling security games

Abstract

In some security domains, the defender holds more private information than the attacker, such as the authenticity of resources. A mock camera can be adopted by the defender to deter potential attackers while the attacker may see it as a real one. This provides an opportunity for a defender with fake resources to bluff, as if all resources she owns are real. We model the bluffing behavior as a signaling game where the attacker is uncertain whether the defender is strong (all resources are real) or weak (fake resources disguised as real resources). We propose a mixed integer cubic programming formulation to solve for the solution concept based on perfect Bayesian equilibrium. We compare our bluffing security game model with a model without signaling. The experiments indicate that our model outperforms the no-signaling model in terms of the defender's utility.

A game of information security investment considering security insurance and complementary information assets

“…Solak and Zhuo (2020) analyze the information sharing decisions of a firm in the context of information system security. Some other references concerning security investment are listed in the literature (Gal‐Or and Ghose, 2005; Lye and Wing, 2005; Feng and Li, 2011; Shirtz and Elovici, 2011; Wang et al., 2011; Hua and Bapna, 2013; Huang et al., 2014; Gao et al., 2015; Gao and Zhong, 2015; Wu et al., 2017; Liu et al., 2018; Weishäupl et al., 2018; Wu et al., 2018, 2020; Chen et al., 2022; Li and Xu, 2021). What makes the above‐mentioned studies differ from ours is that they do not consider information security insurance.…”